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ABSTRACT
Turnaround Strategies in the Banking Industry
(September, 1980)
Hugh M. O'Neill, B.A., Syracuse University
M.S., Polytechnic Institute of New York
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor George S. Odiome

This research project uses discriminant analysis to study the proc¬
ess of turnaround in the commercial banking industry.
The Bank Compustat Database provides the sample.

Ihe annual net in¬

come growth of all banks in the data base is compared to the industry's
performance in net income growth.

If a bank's annual growth exceeds the

industry's, then that year is recorded as a growth year.

If a bank's

annual growth lags the industry's growth rate, then that year is recorded
as a decline year.

Banks which exhibit three years of continuous decline

provide the base for further analysis.
After a period of three year decline, which is called phase 1, the
banks in the sample either turnaround or decline during the next three
years.

This three year period following phase 1 is called phase 2, and

provides the grouping variable for discrimination; a group of turnaround
banks is compared to a group of decline banks.

Ihe final sample includes

51 banks; 31 are turnaround banks, and 20 are decline banks.
After the sample is identified, the study proceeds through several
stages.

First, the Bank Compustat Database provides the records of each
VI1

bank's performance on twenty three variables over the six year period of
the phase 1 and phase 2.

These twenty three variables measure eight gen¬

eral classes of performance:

profitability, expense control, employee

utilization, asset management, revenue enhancement, credit quality con¬
trol, leverage and loss coverage, and growth measures.

Second, the ex¬

planatory power of these variables is tested through a regression model.
Third, mean growth rates on each variable for the groups are ccmputed and
tested for the first three years.

Finally, the dimensions of the group

differences are analyzed through the use of discriminant analysis.
The discriminant analysis is performed at the first and third year
of phase 1 and at the first and third year of phase 2.

Where there is

significant discrimination, the best set of discriminators is identified
through the use of the structure loading matrix.

The ten best discrim¬

inators are then used in a discriminant analysis.

The discriminatory

power of other variables not included in this reduced set is assessed by
testing the increase they contribute to the Mahalanobis difference be¬
tween the groups.

A discriminant analysis is also performed on factor

scores for each general class of performance.
After the quantitative analysis, the public reports available for each
bank in the sample are inspected.

This qualitative analysis includes such

sources as popular journal articles, trade journal articles, annual re¬
ports, and special staff reports.

This review is used to gain insight

into management's perceptions of the turnaround strategy.
The results of the study indicate that the turnaround requires man¬
agement attention in several key areas.
vm

Turnaround banks increase the

amount of net income earned per employee, through the careful control of
operating expenses, asset growth, and loan quality.

The hypothesis that

regional differences, structural differences, or size differences can ex¬
plain the turnaround process is tested through the use of a durrmy regres¬
sion model.

This hypothesis is rejected.

The qualitative review indicates that banks which don't turnaround
attempt to enact the same strategies that turnaround banks enact.

This

unexpected finding leads to two proposed hypotheses for further research.
First, it is possible that successful turnaround can be attributed to
successful implementation, rather than successful choice, of strategy.
Second, it is possible that there are at least two types of decline.
Strategies that are successful for one type of decline will not be suc¬
cessful for another type of decline.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

When a large multi million dollar business is in a state of steady
decline, what strategies must its management follow to reverse that trend
and start it on an upward course?

The answers to this question are

sought in this research.
This study analyzes strategic responses to continued declines in
profitability in commercial banks, as measured by net income.

The aim

of the study is to identify the response patterns which commercial banks
may use to turn around from steady decline to an upward trend of rising
net income.
After a comparative study of banks which turned around and banks
which didn't, the variables which were changed, manipulated or altered by
management are analyzed, and are clustered into strategic patterns which
comprise turnaround strategies.

Thus, one objective of this research is

to identify the content of turnaround strategies.
While the research study is done with banks, we first make an effort
to define what might be the basis for turning around the fortunes in the
market place of other companies not in banking.

Continued decline often

precedes failure, and since the possibility of business failure is one
which is of concern to society, as well as the employees, creditors, de¬
positors, customers and stockholders of companies which are in a state of

1

2
decline, the search for some general strategic principles behind turn¬
around action is one of some significance and considerable scholarly in¬
terest.

The variables studied.

Strategic patterns of response are observed through

an analysis of the performance of banks on several operating and financial
variables.

Eight general classes of variables are analyzed:

profitabil¬

ity measures, expense control measures, employee utilization measures, asset
management, revenue enhancement, credit quality control measures, leverage
and loss coverage, and growth measures.

Banks which continually decline are

compared to banks which enter a period of decline, and then turnaround and
enter a period of growth in net income.

Decline is operationalized through

the comparison of an individual bank's rate of growth in net income to the
industry's rate of growth in net income.

When a bank's net income has in¬

creased at a lesser rate than industry net income, its performance for
that year is recorded as a decline.

Conversely, when a bank has increased

its income at a rate greater than industry growth, its performance is re¬
corded as growth. This operational definition of decline follows the meth¬
odology of previous studies on decline and turnaround.

The population studied.
of Compustat tapes.

The initial sample is identified through the use

(See Appendix I)

These computer tapes contain the

record of the performance ratios of 136 banks over many years.

A twenty

year period (1959-1978) is covered to identify the banks to be studied.
The initial sample of subject banks includes all banks which have three
consecutive years of performance declines. This three year period is
called "phase one" throughout the stud};.

The three years following the
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decline (called "phase 2" throughout the study) determine whether the bank
meets the requirements of the study of being a turnaround bank.

The final

sample includes banks which exhibit three consecutive years of growth in
phase 2, or three consecutive years of decline in phase 2. These are called
pure turnaround banks, or pure decline banks, respectively. .

The final

sample also includes those banks which exhibit at least two consecutive
years of growth in phase 2, or two consecutive years of decline in phase 2
These are called turnaround banks, or decline banks, respectively.

This

design creates a sample of banks which have declined which can then be sub¬
divided into groups which reversed the decline, and groups which did not.
The calendar period is not the same for each bank.

For example, one bank

may be analyzed for its turnaround during the years 1972 through 1978,
while another bank may be analyzed during the period 1969 to 1975.

The

comparison is made for the decline and turnaround period, rather than ac¬
tual calendar periods.

The problem to be solved.

The research problem is directed at analyzing

the differences between the turnaround and decline groups.

The study is

designed to answer several fundamental and important questions, such as:
- are there specific strategies which banks use to turnaround per¬
formance?
- are there specific conditions within an individual bank which pro¬
mote turnarounds in performance?
- are there specific significant differences between banks which turn¬
around and those which don't?
- can the differences which exist between turnaround banks and nonturnaround banks be controlled by the management of those banks?
- are the conditions of turnaround determined outside the control
of management; that is, in the environment?

4

The answers to these questions should refute or support the hypothesis
proposed by Glueck that "the major cause of growth, decline and other
large scale changes in firms are exogenous factors in their environment,
rather than any purely internal developments" (1972, p. 108).

Relation to Broader Management Theory

This study will add to the growing body of knowledge in the field of
strategic planning.

Strategy is a match between the organization's capa¬

bilities and its environment (Ansoff, 1965; Drucker, 1954; Hofer and
Schendel, 1979).

An effective strategy is one which leads to the out¬

comes intended by the strategy designers.

This study will identify the

content of strategies which lead a declining bank from the condition of
decline to the condition of growth.

Thus, the study will answer the call

for more studies which analyze strategy within specific industries (Hatten,
1979).

The study should also add to our understanding of the contingent

nature of strategy (Hofer, 1975; Luthans and Stewart, 1977; Weir, 1979).
The field of business policy has recently developed as a distinct
discipline within business schools (Hofer and Schendel, 1979).

The re¬

search for this field has focused on the concept of strategic planning.
The research methodology ranges from single case studies to complex multiorganizational studies (e.g., Rumelt, 1974; Hatten, 1974).

While signif¬

icant progress has been made in the attempt to understand the complex proc¬
ess of strategic planning, much work remains to be done.
There are two main reasons for the need to increase the research ef¬
forts in the field of strategic planning.

First, much of the research has

5
been exploratory-normative.

That is, policy experts have analyzed single

organizations and prescribed what the best strategy would be for that or¬
ganization.

If the strategy works, the analyst generalizes that strategy

to any and all organizations.

This method has generated many interesting

hypotheses, but the hypotheses await further testing to assure their val¬
idity.

Second, the strategic planning process is an extremely complex one.

One theorist identifies 55 variables which impact the effectiveness of a
strategic plan.

Many of these variables change quickly over time.

No

single study can hope to control or analyze all the appropriate variables.
The discipline probably will be built through careful research, with each re¬
searcher working on separate parts of the problem.

In time, theories will

develop which reflect the process more powerfully and accurately than cur¬
rent theories do.
Generally, however, it seems there is some agreement that the strate¬
gic planning process involves several steps.

These include a strategic

profile, an analysis of the environment, strategic forecasting, a resource
audit, the generation of strategic alternatives, a test of consistency,
and a strategic choice (Uyterhoeven, Ackerman and Rosenblum, 1973).
The strategic profile is an explicit definition of the firm's busi¬
ness

or businesses,

its competition, and its self concept.

Ibis profile

is used to identify how the firm competes, and how well it competes.
The analysis of the environment is a definition of the factors out¬
side of the direct control of the business which impact the firm's per¬
formance.

These factors include

but are not limited to

competing firms,

economic conditions, local and federal government regulations, interest
groups, customers, and suppliers.

The strategic forecast is a natural

6

extension of the analysis of the environment.

In this setup, the firm's

management attempts to identify the future patterns of activity in the
relevant environmental dimensions, and how these future patterns will im¬
pact the firm.
The resource audit is an analysis of the firm's internal dimensions.
In this audit, the management analyzes the firm's operational, financial,
and managerial strengths and/or weaknesses.
The generation of strategic alternatives is an attempt to identify
the full set of possible actions which the firm might undertake to improve
its performance.

The methods for generating these alternatives include

brainstorming and research.

As the alternatives are generated, they are

tested for consistency; that is, do these alternatives match the firm's
abilities and goals?

The distinction must be made between what the firm

might do, and what the firm should do.

This process leads to the final

step of strategic choice, which is a decision which identifies the firm's
future course.
Each of these steps requires different skills and information.

The

successful completion of each step will lead to an effective strategy;
that is, one which meets the goals of the strategy designer.
goals require different strategies.

Different

Similarly, different economic con¬

ditions require different strategies, etc.
This study assumes that a strategy designer has specific goals, such
as the goal to reverse decline, under specific conditions, i.e., a three
year decline.

The study analyzes what the content of successful strategy

would be given that the strategic agent chooses the goal of turnaround.
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The Outline of This Report
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will report the lit¬
erature review.

The literature reviewed includes previous research in

the area of strategic planning, the area of bank management, and the area
of business success and failure.

The literature review will also include

a review of studies which have used methodologies similar to those em¬
ployed in this study.
Chapter 3 will introduce the research design and methodology.
methodology includes quantitative and qualitative components.

The

In the

quantitative analysis, multivariate discriminant analysis will be used to
analyze the dimensions of difference between the groups of interest.

This

analysis will supplement univariate analysis (t-tests), and regression
analysis

which will be used to assess the explanatory power of the finan¬

cial and operating variables used.

The qualitative analysis includes a

review of primary and secondary sources to assess the expressed intentions
of management during the period of study.

Several authors suggest that

observed strategic patterns can be different than intended strategic pat¬
terns (Mintzberg, 1972).

This qualitative analysis will serve to test

whether intended patterns were different than observed patterns.

Where

appropriate, exogenous factors will be tested through blocking.
Chapter 4 will present the results of the analysis.
ple will be identified.
will be reported.

First, the sam¬

Then, the results of the regression and t-tests

This will be followed by a report of the results of

the discriminant analysis.
Chapter 5 will present a thorough analysis of the results.

The pur¬

pose of Chapter 5 will be to synthesize the information developed through
hypothesis testing, in order to present a clear picture of the differences

8
between banks which turnaround and banks which continue to decline.
Chapter 6 will present the results of the qualitative research.

This

chapter will present the strategies that are enacted by banks after a
period of decline.

While the hypothesis testing in Chapter 4 will iden¬

tify what actually happened in the turnaround and decline banks, the
analysis in Chapter 6 will discuss the antecedent actions which contrib¬
uted to the decline or failure.
Chapter 7 will close the study with a sunmary, and with suggestions
for future research.

The strengths and limitations of the research.

This study has several

strengths and weaknesses, which shall be presented in order.
The strengths of the study include its classification of conditions
and its control of extraneous variables.

The study is designed to iden¬

tify those strategies which are successful after a firm has undergone a
period of decline in a specific industry.

While this strength limits the

results of the study to the banking industry, its successful completion
will add general validity to the normative literature which suggests that
strategic planning is possible and necessary (Steiner, 1979; Holmberg,
1978).

As such, it should add to our growing knowledge of the tools avail¬

able to management to improve performance.

The control of extraneous var¬

iables will be provided through the consideration of alternative explana¬
tions for the turnaround process.

These controls will add validity to the

findings about variables which management can control in the turnaround
process.
The combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques adds fur¬
ther strength to the study.

Any variation found in the statistical
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analysis can be due to chance; the review of other sources will help re¬
duce the doubt about chance variations.

Where a strategy has been initiated,

the secondary sources will confirm its use.

Additionally, the secondary

sources will provide further confirmatory information about the differences
or lack thereof

between the groups.

The limitations of the study also are important.

Due to its applica¬

tion to the banking industry alone, the results will not be amenable to
generalization beyond the banking industry.

Since the banking industry

is almost unique in terms of its regulatory environment, this weakness can¬
not be avoided.

As mentioned above, the confirmation of management dis¬

cretion to improve performance in a highly regulated industry will lend
strength to the model of strategy for all industries.
A major weakness of the study is its ex post facto nature.

This

weakness is unavoidable because the process of decline and turnaround can¬
not be manipulated directly by the researcher.

The major weakness of such

studies is the risk of improper interpretation (Kerlinger, 1973).

This

weakness can be overcome by the use of hypothesis generation, and the use
of control hypotheses.

This study has attempts to use both methods to re¬

duce the risk of improper interpretation.

Of course, little can be said

about causality because of the infinite domain of alternative possible
explanations.

In general, experimental control might provide more strength

for causal arguments.

Rather than debate the importance of the relation¬

ships uncovered in this study, I will list the thoughts of Kerlinger:
"... the study of cause and causation is an endless maze.

One of the dif¬

ficulties is that the word 'cause' has surplus meaning and metaphysical
undertones.

Perhaps more important, it is not really needed.

Scientific

research can be done without evoking cause and causal explanations"
(Kerlinger, p. 393).

CHAPTER

II

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction and Purpose
Per Hofer and Schendel (1978), "the basic characteristics of the
match an organization achieves with its environment is called its strat¬
egy".

This match can occur by accident, or by planning.

As organiza¬

tions and their environments become more complex, a successful match re¬
quires careful planning.
Strategic planning has been defined in different ways by different
authors.

Drucker (1954) calls strategy the answer to two questions:

''what is our business" and "what should it be?".

Andrews (1971) calls

strategy "the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and major poli¬
cies and plans for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to de¬
fine what business the company is in or is to be in and the kind of com¬
pany it is or is to be".

Ansoff (1965) calls strategy a "conmon thread"

that matches an organization's activities and the products and markets
that the organization competes in..

The following chart compares the concept of strategy according to the
leading text authors in the field.

The major difference between these

authorities lies in their definition of the field. I list the arguments
of Hofer and Schendel here.

Some authorities hold a broad view of the

subject; they define strategy as the process of setting goals and objec¬
tives, choosing strategies, implementing strategies, and controlling or
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A Comparison of Various Authors' Concepts of Strategy and the Strategy Formulation Process

Table 1
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13
monitoring performance.
ject.

Other authorities hold a narrow view of the sub¬

They define strategy as a choice of means to a given end.

They

separate the steps of formulating goals and objectives, implementing strat¬
egy, and monitoring performance from the strategic planning process.

Both

views are useful; the research in this study follows the narrow view, in
that the problem analyzed is the choice of means to a desired end.
This literature review includes three sections:

first, there is a

review of the literature on strategy; second, there is a review of the
literature on the problem of failure and turnaround; third, there is a
review of the literature on bank management.

Strategy

The process of strategic choice.

Those who hold the broad view of the

field of strategy rarely separate the term "strategy" from the term "plan¬
ning."

Planning is a highly reflective activity, in which the planner iden¬

tifies current conditions, current trends, future conditions, and future
trends.

The planner then matches his organization's capabilities with

the requirements of future conditions, in order to maximize his goals.
There is no doubt that this highly reflective process is being used.

Gen¬

eral Electric, for example, employs a staff which exists for this purpose.
Popular periodicals report the efforts of consulting groups which offer
their services and expertise in the area of planning.
of such planning efforts is a roadmap to the future.

The ultimate goal
The practical re¬

sult of these efforts often falls short of the goal.
Several theorists have noted that strategy can occur without the con¬
cept of planning.
in three modes:

Mintzberg (1972) argues that strategy can be developed
adaptive, planning, and entrepreneurial.

14
The adaptive mode of strategy occurs when an organization reacts in
a disjointed manner to external pressures.

The adaptive mode of planning

is similar to the process of organization described by Cyert and March
(1963), wherein management is described as reacting to a range of goals
in a sequential manner.

The sequence of goals can be determined by fac¬

tors beyond the immediate control of management.
The planning mode of strategy is the systematic, integrated process
most often associated with strategy.

In this process, top management de¬

signs strategy through the use of sophisticated methodologies provided
either by management or staff specialists.

This model of managerial be¬

havior can be traced back to the prescriptions of early management theo¬
rists (Fayol, 1949; Gulick, 1937), who called upon management to plan,
organize, coordinate, etc.
The third mode of planning is the entrepreneurial mode, in which a
great leader pushes an organization forward through his inspired knowl¬
edge and skills.

This model of planning grows from economic literature,

which describes the influence of the owner manager in the process of busi¬
ness development.

The entrepreneurial mode of strategy has been studied

most extensively by Collins and Moore (1964).
Dunlop (1977) supports the view that strategy is adaptive.
writes:

He

"decisions largely flow from the relatively short-term pressures

of necessity and the clash of conflicting interest, not from the ideas of
intellectuals, their voices in the air, or frcm their memoranda.

And in¬

terest groups are far too pragmatic to be the puppets of intellectuals."
While Dunlop's main experience in the process of policy formulation was
in government. He wrote these words soon after he stepped down as Secretary
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of Labor.

There is little doubt that the corporate environment

business environment

or the

is quickly becoming similar to the political en¬

vironment in terms of the necessity to respond to "the clash of conflicting interests."

Elkins and Callaghan (1978) review the increasing pres¬

sure on business executives that comes from the same lobbies which Dunlop
refers to.
Lindblom (1959) describes the adaptive process as "muddling through."
Quinn (1978) argues in a similar vein.

He states that "when well-managed

major organizations make significant changes in strategy, the approaches
they use frequently bear little resemblance to the rational analytical
system so often touted in the planning literature.
rarely written down in any one place.

The full strategy is

The process used to arrive at total

strategy are typically fragmented, evolutionary, and largely intuitive."
Quinn describes the process of strategy building in 10 major companies,
and concludes that the strategy is built through a system of "logical
incrementalism."

This is a proactive technique in which top management

deals with many subsystems in the organization.
trial and error, a strategy is reached.

Through a process of

Murray (1978) describes a sim¬

ilar process, and calls strategy a negotiated outcome.
The planning mode of strategy design receives extensive attention
in the literature, and normative theories teach that strategists should
plan.

Several studies show that planners out-perform non-planners.

and House (1970) matched pairs of companies in several industries.

Ihune
They

found that formal planners outperformed non-planners in the area of re¬
turn on investment, return on equity, and earnings per share growth, while
maintaining equal performance

or better

with non-planners in the area

16
of sales growth.

Herold (1972) extended these studies for four additional

years, and found that planners increased their lead in most of the per¬
formance measures.

Karger and Malik (1975) did a similar study for ten

years in the machinery, electronic, and chemical industries, and found
the same trends:

planners consistently outperformed non-planners.

The success of planning in these studies might suggest that planning
is the mode necessary for effective strategy, but Quinn's study was of
successful companies.

They did not use systematic planning methods pre¬

scribed by the strategic planning models.

Rue and Fulmer (1973) found

that planning did not lead to better results in the production of non¬
durable goods, while it did lead to better results in the production of
services and industrial goods.

Sheehan (1975) found sane Canadian firms

which did not plan outperformed other firms which did plan.
The evidence, then, is inconsistent.

Planning is clearly a necessary

methodology for design in strategy in some instances.

In other instances,

alternate methodologies, adaptive, incrementalism, etc., may be necessary.
Some theorists suggest that the bridge between the competing views of the
strategic design process may lie in the nature of the environment. We use
the environment to mean all those variables which impact management, but
which management cannot control.

Khandwalla (1976) argues that if the

environment is highly dynamic, then strategy must be flexible and innova¬
tive.

One might observe a strategy that is flexible and innovative, and

call it adaptive or incremental.

In a non-dynamic environment, strategy

(per Khandwalla) can be very specific.
cific strategy a planned strategy.

One might call this type of spe¬

In a similar vein, Paine and Anderson

(1977) argue that highly uncertain environments call for an adaptive mode
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of strategy:

"including incremental, remedial decisions arrived at in

part through bargaining among members of a power coalition".

In environ¬

ments of perceived certainty, Paine and Anderson suggest that the plan¬
ning mode is necessary.
The banking environment during the period of this study has been per¬
ceived as an uncertain one by bankers.

Baker (1973) lists the unprece¬

dented rate of change which has taken place in the banking industry in
the following areas over recent years:

volatile interest rates, changed

deposit mix, Regulation Q, growth of non-interest expense relative to
non-interest income, asset composition, capital considerations, perform¬
ance measurement, improved management information systems, and theoretical
developments.

This uncertain environment suggests that the strategies

observed in this study may not be formally planned by the managers enact¬
ing them.

How, then, do we define the strategies of interest?

Mintzberg (1972) defines strategy "as a pattern in a stream of sig¬
nificant decisions."

Khandwalla (1977) defines strategy as a "coupling

together of decisions, guidelines, and hueristics."
the ideas of these authorities.
stream of decisions.

This study adopts

Strategy is defined as a pattern in a

This pattern can be observed through an analysis

of the decision outcomes.

By observing the results of performance, that

is, by measuring performance on operational and financial variables, the
study will deduce the contents of strategy.

Strategic choices and the contingencies which affect them.

Regardless

of the process used to arrive at a strategic choice, the actual choice
is the critical variable of interest for the strategy designer.

The

18
choice must be one which can lead to desired outcomes.

A strategic choice

is the selection of a set of actions from an infinite range of possible
actions.

The chosen set of action is called the "content" of the strat¬

egy (Hofer, 1973, 1975; Bourgeois, 1980).

Research on strategy content

attempts to discover successful and unsuccessful strategies.

This sec¬

tion will briefly review a portion of this literature.
The primary decision in strategy is the decision of which businesses
the firm will compete in.

This primary decision rarely occurs for the

small business, and occurs more often for the large business.

Bourgeois

suggests that strategy is best studied by separating primary decisions
from secondary decisions.

Secondary decisions are decisions about how

to compete in a given business arena.

For corporations which compete in

major businesses, portfolio management is one tool which has been devel¬
oped to aid in the process of primary decision making (Boston Consulting
Group, (1968)).

Portfolio theory guides the decision maker to a choice

of strategy which will maximize returns while minimizing risk for the
corporation.

Each business in the corporation must then make the secon¬

dary choice of how to compete in its industry
corporate strategy.

within the constraints of

For this study, the primary decision is a constraint

the firms analyzed have chosen to compete in the caimercial banking in¬
dustry.

The task of this study is to determine effective strategy choices

after a bank's performance has declined for three years.

Similar studies, that is, studies of secondary strategy, have been
done by several researchers.

Schoeffler, Buzzell, and Heany (1974) find

that 37 factors explain 80% of the variance in profit of a wide range of
companies in several industries.

Homermesh, Anderson and Harris (1978)
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find that successful low market share companies follow specific strate¬
gies such as competing in carefully segmented markets, making efficient
use of research and development budgets, limiting growth and diversifica¬
tion, and employing a strong executive officer.

Gutmann (1964) finds

that growth strategies include:
1)

choice of a general industrial field growing quicker than the
economy

2)

or choice of specific fast growing sub-sectors

3)

or choice of fast expanding market segments

4)

or choice of subsectors before everybody else

The Hcmermesh, Anderson and Harris study, and the Gutmann study, are
illustrative of a wide range of studies which are situational in nature.
They assume a goal, , that is, to be a successful low market share company,
or a successful growth company;,

and then analyze the content of strate¬

gies which have been used by companies to attain these goals.

Such situ¬

ational studies may be the first step in the development of a contingency
theory of strategic management.
Per Hofer and Schendel, "the contingency theory approach is concerned
with the mid range body of theory which stands between 'universal truths'
and 'each situation is unique.'

The contingency approach seeks to deter¬

mine a relationship in which observable response in and to organizations
is dependent upon specific environmental conditions" (1979, p. 103).
They identify four types of strategy:

environment, corporate, business,

and functional strategy. Corporate strategy is similar to Bourgeois'
primary decision, while business strategy is similar to Bourgeois' sec¬
ondary strategy.

Hofer (1975) reviewed the field of business strategy

20
in an attempt to build a contingency theory of business strategy.

He re¬

viewed studies by Chevelier (1972), Fruhan (1972), the Boston Consulting
Group (1970), Udell (1972), Khandwalla (1974) and Schaeffler et al.
(see Table #2).
this theory:

(1974)

Hofer lists three difficulties in the attempt to build

1) the situational nature of the field; 2) the lack of data

bases; and 3) the difficulty of designing the data bases.

The empirical

work to date offers a rich base of knowledge, but they "lack precision
with regard to the circumstances in which they apply" (Hofer, 1975).

The

circumstances in which these findings would apply are contingent upon
significant environmental and organizational variables (Table #3 lists
some of the significant variables).

The variables include economic con¬

ditions, demographic conditions, sociocultural trends, political and legal
factors, supplier variables, industry structure variables, market and con¬
sumer variables, and organizational characteristics and resources.

A

contingent theory would relate certain strategic variables with certain
strategic choices.

For example, given a particular industry structure,

with economic growth, and high market share, the firm should choose a
particular option for competition in the marketplace.

To date, the num¬

ber of clearly defined contingencies is small, because of the large num¬
ber of contingent variables.
careful classification system.

This problem might be solved through a
Such a system would group key variables

together; in effect, the data reduction would achieve parsimony; this
parsimony would lead to theory which has greater general applicability.
A technique which Hofer uses to achieve such parsimony is to identify
life cycle stages of products as a key variable.

At each stage of the

life cycle, only a few of the variables in each class of variables are
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strategically important.

For example, in the maturity stage, the rele¬

vant competitor variables are the degree of specialization within the in¬
dustry and the degree of capacity utilization.

(For a similar classifi¬

cation technique, see Tuason (1973)).
Another approach to building contingency theories is the approach
which controls certain environmental or organizational variables.

Rumelt

(1974) controlled organizational variables through a product mix clas¬
sification scheme.

He classified firms as single product, dominant prod¬

uct, and related and unrelated product businesses.

He tested the propo¬

sition that each type of firm required different strategies and different
organizational structures.

Schendel and Patton (1976) controlled environ¬

mental variables through the use of SIC codes.
measure of product-market diversity.

Ward (1976) developed a

He used a Delphi method to classify

firms according to degree of product market diversity.

Theoretically,

firms in different classifications would require different strategies.
Ford (1978) classified economic conditions and competitive conditions in
the banking industry through the use of dummy variables in a regression
model.

Mayne (1976) used a similar system to classify bank management

policies for particular types of bank organization structures.

In these

different approaches, the relevant strategy choice depends upon the busi¬
ness' classification in a particular product classification, or productmarket diversity classification, or SIC code, etc.
The crucial choice for the contingency theory researcher is the choice
of variables which will be identified as the key variables.

To date,

there is no consensus as to what those variables should be.

Any set of

variables chosen leaves a wider set unchosen.

That wider set may explain
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more than the chosen set.

There have been suggestions that the key vari¬

ables are the environment and the organization.

Paine and Anderson (1977)

argue the important effect of the environment on the process of planning.
Luthans and Stewart (1977) suggest that the key variables are the en¬
vironment, the management, and the set of resources available.

But these

classifications are arbitrary, to the extent that there is no agreement
on the methods necessary to measure these key variables.

In the case of

classifying organizations, for example, both deductive and inductive
methods have been used.

However, a general contingency theory cannot be

built until some agreement has been reached about the definition and mea¬
surement of key variables.

Industry as a key contingent variable.

One of the possible key variables

in the design of strategy may be the industry variable.
ferences affect the success of strategic choice.

Industrial dif¬

For example, in the

brewing industry, there is a relationship between market share and return
on equity (Hatten, 1974; Patton, 1976).

In pooled industry studies, there

is a positive relationship between market share and return on equity; that
is, as market share increases, returns on equity increase.

When homogen¬

eous brewer groups are studied, however, the relationship changes.

By

defining three groups of brewers (national, regional, and local), the
researchers found that there is a negative relationship between return
on equity and market share within each group.

This research offers sup¬

port for the idea that there are different successful strategies within
an industry.

One might easily reason

as Hatten does (1979)

relationships change from industry to industry.

that these

A good strategy in one

industry is not necessarily valid in another industry.
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Other researchers have chosen industry as the key variable for analy¬
sis.

Graham and Richards (1979) studied deteriorating firms in the rail¬

road industry.

Datta (1979) studied firms in the television industry

for the period 1950-1960.

Datta writes:

"this research is based on the

premise that because of its inherently complex nature and vast differences
not only between but within markets, a generally applicable theory of strat¬
egy at the business level is unlikely to be very meaningful; such a theory
can be better developed through studies of individual industries as op¬
posed to a more global approach."
This research study follows the logic of Datta.
single industry, commercial banking.

It is a study in a

This choice of a single industry

sacrifices our ability to generalize any results to other industries.
This sacrifice is necessary because the commercial banking industry is
unique in many ways.
industries,

It is highly regulated

and its product is unique.

compared to most private

The industry requires study

which focus specifically on this one industry if only because contin¬
gency theories of a more general nature may not apply to the banking in¬
dustry because of its particularly peculiar environment.

Furthermore,

this study analyzes specific conditions in the banking industry.

The

study attempts to identify those strategies which will be successful in
turning around a declining bank's performance.

The next two sections

will review the literature on failure and decline, and the literature
on banking.

Failure and Turnaround

Studies of failure.

A hard fact of business life is that failure is more

common than success.

About 90% of new businesses formed in a given year
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will fail within five years.
adequate management.

Many of these businesses fail due to in¬

The businesses which remain in existence after

five years are not imnune to failure, however.

W. T. Grants, once a

household name, is only one of the many examples of good firms that have
gone bad.

The Grant's example, failure, is an important area of concern

for the policy analyst.

The Grant's example might have been even more

important if management could have saved this giant retail firm from
failure.

Only a few studies have tried to analyze firms which have be¬

gun to decline, and then turned around.
Argenti (1976) writes "the study of the causes and symptoms of com¬
pany failure has been a most neglected area of management.

There is

hardly any literature at all and there is certainly nothing approaching
a body of knowledge such as one can easily find on other management
topics-mergers, for example, or incentive schemes."
There are several reasons for this neglect.
problem cannot be foreseen in most cases.

First, the failure

Therefore, research in the

area of failure is, by its very nature, ex post facto.

Second, the rea¬

sons for failure which are frequently cited are excuses, rather than
causes.

Mach of the information about failure is provided by the man¬

agement which supervised the failure — a highly unreliable source
best.

Third, failures occur randomly.

at

They are not anmenable to the

systematic methods of research.
Nevertheless, some research has taken place on the process of fail¬
ure in organizations.

The literature can be divided into two categories:

Those studies which attempt to predict failure in organizations and those
studies which attempt to describe the conditions in the firm at the time
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of failure.

Many of the predictive studies come from the fields of fi¬

nance and accounting, while many of the descriptive studies come from the
fields of policy and organizational behavior.

We shall review studies

from each category.
The research problem in this study is not failure, but rather turn¬
around.

However, the turnaround process occurs after a period of decline.

The literature on failure exhibits some clues about the nature of the de¬
cline process.

The accounting/finance studies.

Beaver (1968) studied failing firms to

test which financial ratios are the best predictors of failure.

He de¬

fined failure as the "inability to pay financial obligations as they
mature."

He used a sample, identified through Moody's, of failed and

non-failed firms during the period 1954 through 1964.

Through three dif¬

ferent methods, he tested the effectiveness of measures conmonly used to
analyze firm performance by investors.

He found that non-liquid asset

ratios were the best predictors of performance over time.
these predictors are useful over a five year period.
behavior of the failed firm, Beaver states:

He found that

In describing the

"for the most part, the be¬

havior of the failed firm is what would be expected.

They generate less

sales, and the growth in sales is less than that of non-failed firms.
They have poorer cash flow and net income positions, and they incur more
debt.

This combination causes a marked deterioration in their solvency

position" (p. 118).

It is important to note that the successful predic¬

tion of failure fades as you get further away from the failure; it is
easier to predict failure one year from the event than five years from

28
the event.

It is also necessary to note that Beaver's sample includes

only firms which finally reached insolvency; intuitively, one would sus¬
pect that some firms sense their deterioration, and act to turnaround
before reaching the failure stage.
Altman (1968) used a multiple discriminant analysis technique to
assess the effectiveness of financial measures to predict failures.
used data from 1946 to 1965 to identify 66 firms which had failed.

He
He

then matched these failed firms with similar firms which had not failed.
Through the discriminant analysis, he identified five ratios which were
the best predictors of failure over a five year period.
prediction occurred the year before the failure.

Again, the best

As the prediction

model moved away from the time of failure, its ability to predict de¬
clined.

Altman tested the ability of his variables to predict through

the use of the classification matrix. This is a test of how well dis¬
criminant functions, derived from observations on data, predict.

Ihe

following chart lists the classification success rate by year:
One year before failure
two years before failure
three years before failure
four years before failure
five years before failure

95% correctly classified
72%
48%
29%
36%

Altman's analysis did not include firms which might have declined and
then turned around; his study was of firms that were either bankrupt or
non-bankrupt.
Bazley (1976) studied failed firms to test the effectiveness of dif¬
ferent cost measures; historical, adjusted, and current, in predicting
failure.

He found that the best predictors of failure were cash flow/

total liabilities, and net income/total assets.

He cites the causes of

29

failure as inadequate sales, excessive costs, excessive receivables, in¬
ventory difficulties, excessive fixed assets, and availability of credit.
In studies similar to Altman's
sis,

in that they use discriminant analy¬

Emery, Halonen, and MacStravic (1976) and Sinkey (1975) studied

failure in the hospital and banking industry, respectively.

Emery et al.

find that there are key financial and operational variables which predict
failure for different types of hospitals.

For government hospitals, the

key predictors are occupancy, admissions, and personnel variables.

For

non-profit hospitals, the key variables are the number of services, the
expenses per bed, personnel variables, and admission rates.

For profit

hospitals, the key variables are admissions, total expenses, and expenses
per bed.

Emery et al. imply that hospital management can trace these

variables to detect decline in the organization, and act to deter that
decline.

Sinkey, in his study of banks, finds that asset composition,

loan characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and uses of revenue, ef¬
ficiency, and profitability are good indicators of possible problems in
performance.
These studies provide some groundwork for the present study.

The

work of Beaver and Altman strongly suggest that failure can be detected
before it occurs.

Potential failure should trigger some action to pre¬

vent bankruptcy in the declining firm.

These studies suggest that the

period of decline can be observed more than one year before failure, but
less than five years before failure.

The Emery et al. study, and the

Sinkey study, suggest that the declining firm in a specific industry can
trace key variables.
answered.

These studies, however, leave several questions un

Both studies aimed to provide knowledge to industry planners.
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They ingore the processes that occur within the firm while failure is im¬
minent.

This study will identify the specific strategies management has

undertaken to counteract decline.

The sample of interest will not neces¬

sarily be firms which failed, but rather firms which avoided failure.

Management studies.

The aforementioned studies traced the results of cer¬

tain management behaviors.

In these cases, the results were failure.

The

studies hint at the actual management behaviors, but they don't identify
the actions which management took

or didn't take.

and income decline while debt increases.
which precipitate these results?

In failure, sales

What are the management actions

Several studies of the failure process

list the possible behaviors of failing management.
Argenti lists three main reasons for failure:
accounting defects, and resistance to change.

management defects,

His research is based on

discussion with the caretakers of failing organizations; accountants, re¬
ceivers, bankers and analysts, and on the history of failing organiza¬
tions.

The management defects include the heavy reliance on one man

usually an autocrat,

the use of a passive board

or a board which does

not have a good mix of directors who have functional business skill,
an insufficient depth of top management.

and

The accounting defects include

the inability of the organization to accurately assess cost and profit
performance.

Failing firms make key mistakes; leveraged too highly, over¬

trading, and engaged in large projects, which better accounting informa¬
tion might have helped the firm to avoid.

The resistance to change in¬

cludes the unwillingness of the organization to update products, proc¬
esses and equipment, and the unwillingness to engage in planning.

Argenti
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asserts that all firms might not have all the defects listed but they all
have at least one defect in each area.
Richards (1973) studied 8 private firms and two government firms.
He defines failure in more general terms than Beaver:

"failure is a rel¬

ative term but the firms reported upon experienced failure in the sense
that a severe setback in relation to their strategic plans occurred."
The types of failure observed in this study included extreme cost over¬
runs, bail out by other institutions, bankruptcy, and forced mergers.
Richards notes that failing firms made overoptimistic estimates of proj¬
ects, they suppressed contrary information, and they had dognatic leaders.
These findings concur with Argenti's findings.
Miller (1977) defined failure as a protracted period of poor prof¬
its and declining market share.

He ran a factor analysis to analyze the

dimensions of management behavior in failing firms.
patterns emerged:

the impulsive firm, the stagnant bureaucracy, the head¬

less firm, and the firm swinming upstream.
result of extremes:

He found that four

Failure in these firms is the

too much or too little product-market innovation;

too many or too few controls, too powerful or too weak a chief executive.
The findings of this study are similar to the findings of Argenti and
Richards.

Indeed, Richard states:

"initial comparisons of failing to

successful firms indicate that the successful enterprises are less risk
prone, less optimistic, and more objective in information processing than
the firms reported on in this study.

This comparison alone can be ex¬

tremely dangerous, however, if one attempts to extrapolate policy impli¬
cations to conclude that complete information processing, no risk expo¬
sure, and executive pessimism are preferred strategic orientations.
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Rather, strategic success and failure are probably curvilinearly related
to these variables such that optimal strategy lies at neither extreme."
These studies suggest that there are management patterns in the
failure process.

They suggest that the way to avoid failure is to avoid

these management patterns.

Yet, the studies look at organizations which

fail, rather than organizations which turnaround.

Studies of turnaround.

Graham and Richards (1979) studied the patterns

of strategic change in rail based holding companies after a period of
deterioration in performance.

Their study suggests many interesting ideas

about the turnaround process.
The most important idea stressed in these studies is that strategic
change requires a major deterioration in performance:

"Cyert and March

suggest that problem solving search does not wander very far from past
and familiar solutions.

Strategic change, however, constitutes a dra¬

matic alteration of prior organizational activity.

Thus, revising strat¬

egy would not be contemplated unless organizational slack had in some way
been reduced to unsatisfactory levels."
idea.

Their study confirms this key

Firms which did enact strategic changes (the strategic change in

this study was diversification) had significantly lower returns than
firms which did not enact these changes.

The change included changes in

the composition of the Boards of Directors, and changes in the experi¬
ence

and background of the management team.
The implication of these findings is that the management of a de¬

clining firm may not be able to diversify the firm.

If these findings

are accurate in all cases, they imply that turnarounds which include
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diversification require substantial changes in the management team.

Fur¬

thermore, this study implies that diversification strategies may be strat¬
egies of a last resort.

It is possible that the management in a declin¬

ing organization either accepts the decline as inevitable, or reacts to
the decline in a manner which is ineffective.

Unfortunately, this study

only reports results for firms which did enact diversification strategies.
There is a wide range of alternatives that management might choose during
the condition of decline; this particular study does not identify the
full range.
Schendel and Patton (1976) studied the process of corporate decline
and turnaround.

They studied pairs of firms in similar environments.

One of the firms had declined and turned around; the other firm had con¬
tinually declined.

They analyzed each pair of firms in terms of finan¬

cial measures, management actions, resource allocation, and strategies.
They attempted to identify the key differences in financial and perform¬
ance ratios between failing and non-failing companies.

The results of

their study suggest several interesting factors about the turnaround
process:
"The scenario that emerges from this exploratory re¬
search is that a stagnating or declining company seems
to first need a deepened threat or shock to spur it into
action. Steadily poor performance so long as it does
not develop a crisis seems to be tolerated. Once a
crisis arrives, the firm can move into action. While
there are different specific strategies involved, turn¬
around usually requires substantial changes in the
business; and often new businesses either acquired or
developed internally can lead to sales growth that more
than outstrips investment increments. At the same time,
attendant efficiency moves in working capital, in pro¬
ductivity, and in other areas also are sought; or ef¬
ficiency accrues to strategy changes made."
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This study implies that turnaround often requires a primary strategic
decision; that is, a change of business.
sify into new businesses.

Turnaround firms often diver¬

It is also possible to turnaround through the

use of secondary decisions; that is, the decision to develop new prod¬
ucts or services, or the decision to improve operating efficiency.

Fur¬

thermore, the failure to turnaround can be traced to several sources:
the strategy choice could be the wrong choice. In one set of matched
pairs, growth through acquisition and merger worked while growth through
internal expansion did not work.

The strategy choice could be frustrated

by government; in one case, a firm's attempt to expand was stopped by
government action; or the strategy choice could fail to poor implementa¬
tion.
Ross and Kami (1973) did an intensive study of firms which failed,
and developed a set of prescriptions for management.

These ten conmand-

ments are:
1.

Develop and comnunicate a strategy

2.

Use overall controls and costs controls

3.

Insist on an active board of directors

4.

Avoid one man rule

5.

Provide management depth

6.

Keep informed of, and react to, change

7.

Don't overlook the power of customers

8.

Use, but don't abuse, computers

9.

Do not engage in accounting manipulations

10. Provide an organizational structure that meets the needs of the
workforce
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This study implies that there are strategies which a firm can use to
avoid failure.

The strategies suggested by this study are similar to

the strategies suggested by the studies reviewed to this point.
This research analyzes the process of decline and turnaround in the
comnercial banking industry.

The research is based on the premise that

management can detect a decline (Beaver, Altman), and enact specific
although not necessarily unique

strategies to counteract that decline.

The research is an attempt to refute the hypothesis, proposed by Glueck,
that "the major cause of growth, decline and other large scale changes
in firms are exogenous factors in their environment, rather than any
purely internal developments" (1972, p. 108).

Bank Management Studies

Mich of the literature on the performance of banks has focused on
the comparison of holding companies with other banks, and on problem
banks (Ford, 1974).

Little has been written on the process of managing

successful banks (although excellent texts have been written by Crosse
(1962) and Corns (1968)).

Perhaps the most extensive work on the man¬

agement of successful banks has been done by Ford.

Ford identifies

"high performance banks," and then analyzes the difference between high
performance banks and other banks.

A bank earns the high performance

classification if it has a very high average rate of return for five
years, and if it ranks in the top 50% of profitability for the year pre¬
vious to the year of study. His on-going project is updated annually
Ford finds that there are distinct differences in the management of high
performance banks.

High performance banks earn higher yields on assets,
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and they have much lower expenses than low performing banks.

They pay

their employees more, and they obtain more performance from their em¬
ployees.

They have better loan yields, and higher quality loans than

low performance banks.
Ford traces the cause of performance in high performance banks to
the skills of managers.

The managers of the high performers set finan¬

cial goals, develop long range strategies, establish short range profit
plans, and track and reformulate plans (Ford, 1978).

They succeed in

recessionary times through careful management processes.

Indeed, all

variation in performance can be traced to the careful management of vari¬
ables under the control of management:
"Overall, our tests of non-management factors were not
very conclusive. Although it appears that economic
growth stimulates bank profitability and that exten¬
sive branching and strong competition from thrift in¬
stitutions can depress profitability, the amount of
variation explained by these factors is not very high.
This, coupled with the fact that rates of return for
banks within the same state (and even within more lo¬
calized markets) exhibit substantial differences, sug¬
gests that non-management factors influence only mod¬
estly banks' rate of return; most of the variation in
profitability seems to be caused by factors which man¬
agement should be able to control." (1978)
The factors that management should be able to control fall into several
classes:

profitability, expense, employee utilization, asset manage¬

ment, revenue enhancement, credit quality control, leverage and loss
coverage, and growth measures.

The variables in each of these classes

are listed in Table #4.
Ford's variables are similar to those used by other researchers to
assess bank performance.

For comparison, the variables used by Sinkey

(1975) and Mayne (1976) are listed in Table #5.

Sinkey found that
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Table 4
Ford's Variables
of Bank Performance
Profitability Measures:
1.
2.
3.

Net income/average equity
Return on earning assets
Net interest income/eaming assets

Expensive Control Measures:
4.
5.
6.
7.

Operating expense/earning assets
Overhead/earning assets
Interest on deposits/all deposits
Interest on deposits/time and savings

Employee Utilization Measures:
8.
9.
10.

Net income/employees
Payroll expense/employees
As sets/employees

Asset Management:
11.
12.

Gross loans/all deposits
Cash and treasuries/DDA

Revenue Enhancement:
13.
14.
13.

Loan income/gross loans
Securities income/securities
Municipal income (tax ads)/municipal

Credit Quality Control Measures:
16.
17.

Loan loss provision/earnings assets
Gross chargeoffs/loans

Leverage and Loss Coverage:
18.
19.
20.

Equity assets
Loan loss coverage ratio
Reserve loans

Growth Measures:
21.
22.
23.

Annual asset growth
Annual deposit growth
Annual equity growth
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Table 5
Sinkey's Variables of Bank Performance
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Liquidity
Loan volume
Loan Quality
Capital Adequacy
Efficiency
Sources of Revenue
(as a % of revenue)

la.
2a.
3a.
4a.
5a.
6a.
b.
c.

7.

Uses of Revenue
(as a % of revenue)

7a.
b.

[Cash + U.S. Treasury Sec.]/Assets
Loans/Assets
Provision for Loan Losses/Oper. Expense
Loans/[Capital + Reserves]
Operating Expense/Operating Income
Loan Revenue/Total Revenue
U.S. Treasury Securities' Revenue/
Total Revenue
State & Local Obligations' Revenue/
Total Revenue
Interest Paid on Deposits/Total Revenue
Other Expenses/Total Revenue

Mayne's Variables of Bank Performance
I. Assets
Liquid Assets/Total Assets
Muncipal Securities/Total Assets
Total Loans/Total Assets
Consumer Loans/Total Loans
Residential Mortgages/Total Loans
II. Deposits
Time and Savings Deposits/Total Deposits
Interest on Time and Savings Deposits/Total Time and Savings
Deposits
III. Capital
Capital/Risk Assets
IV. Revenue
Deposit Service Charges/IPC Demand Deposits
Loan Revenue/Total Loans
V. Expenses
Operating Expenses/Total Assets
"Other" Operating Expenses/Total Assets
Loan Losses/Total Loans
VI. Profitability
Operating Profit (After Tax)/Total Assets
Net Profit/Total Capital
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certain factors within these performance variables can be used to dis¬
criminate between problem and non-problem banks.

The factors include

asset composition, loan characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and
uses of revenue, efficiency, and profitability.

These factors can be

controlled by management.
One factor which might affect bank performance is bank structure.
Some banks are holding company banks, that is, a central corporation
owns several banks,

while other banks are unit banks.

Theoretically,

the management of unit banks might be at a disadvantage; the competition
offered by the bigger holding companies might be a variable that they
can't control.

Mayne (1976) finds that this is not true; in an analysis

of the performance of banks managed under different structure, she finds:
"the weight of the empirical evidence reported in this paper indicates
few differences between non-affiliated banks and subsidiaries of decen¬
tralized systems, and little difference between the latter class and mem¬
bers of more formally cohesive groups."

This finding, coupled with Ford's

findings that high performance banks tend to fall in the $10 to $100 mil¬
lion size range, offer further evidence that management controlled fac¬
tors do determine success in the bank, although Mayne's findings are not
confirmed in a similar study done by Johnson and Meinster (1975) .
Baker offers further support for the idea that management can affect
performance in the banking industry:

"high performance banks have been

able to continue recording above average earnings during the deposit mix
transition because they become better at pricing loans and other serv¬
ices, minimized their loan losses, controlled manageable costs, limited
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fixed asset comnitments, and maximized investment income by utilizing tax
exempt securities to reduce the tax burden" (1978, p. 36).
The iixmediately aforementioned research suggests that there is a
difference in bank performance between successful and non-successful
banks that can be traced to management strategies.

The literature, how-

ever, does not assess how a low performance bank becomes a high perform¬
ance bank.

One would guess that they initiate the strategies of high

performers, and turn their performance around in time.

This guess does

little to suggest which of the strategies employed by the high perform¬
ing banks are the most important in terms of turning performance around.
This research study will attempt to identify those strategies which a
declining bank can use to turn performance around.
will present the methodology for the study.

The next chapter

CHAPTER

III

METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology of the study.

The methodo¬

logical section of the chapter is preceded by a discussion of the re¬
search problem, and a discussion of the pertinent hypotheses.

Problem Statement

Over time, the performance of any organization can change.
ganizations grow.

Some organizations decline.

cline for a period of time, and then grow.

Some or¬

Some organizations de¬

This research project focuses

on the phenomena of decline, and decline followed by growth.
There may be an infinite variety of strategies which an organization
can use to turnaround performance.
tors.

This variety is due to several fac¬

First, the cause of the decline can impact the strategy for turn¬

around.

If the decline is due to a particular weakness, then the turn¬

around might be accomplished by removal of the weakness.

For example, a

commonly cited cause of failure is the unwillingness to plan.

If decline

is precipitated by this weakness, then the decline might be counteracted
by the installation of a planning process.

Similarly, a commonly cited

cause of failure is inaccurate accounting information.

Under these con¬

ditions, the failure might be turned around through the installation of
a more effective reporting system.
Creativity lends complexity to the turnaround process.
tions vary for each organization that attempts to turnaround.
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Creative op¬
Turnaround
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efforts are often successful because firms add new products, new markets,
or new businesses.

These new options are almost unlimited; few organ¬

izations are constrained in their options for new competitive vehicles.
A comnon turnaround strategy is the new team of managers approach.
In this approach, the turnaround is accompanied by management and/or
board changes.

If previous research paints an accurate picture, then

there is a threshold point of failure in organizations, as found by
Schendel and Patton (1976) or Graham and Richards (1979), who describe
how organizations only react to sharp declines which have occurred over
a long period of time.

Often, when the organizations reach this thresh¬

old point, there are changes in the management group.
group then enacts new strategies.
the causal agent of the turnaround.

The new management

In these situations, we do not know
If the former management group had

acted before the threshold point to initiate the same strategies which
are initiated after the threshold point, perhaps the turnaround could
have occurred earlier.
The fact that turnaround often requires multiple strategies also
lends complexity to the analysis of these strategies.

Decline is rarely

due to one single factor (Argenti, 1976; Richards, 1973); turnaround,
similarly, is rarely due to one single factor.
tion on several fronts.

Success requires atten¬

Any turnaround strategy is really a mixture of

several strategies.
A priori, we can identify turnaround strategies that might be per¬
tinent to comnercial banks.

The research problem is to identify those

strategies which successful turnaround banks use.

Furthermore, the
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research problem is to isolate other factors which might cause the turn¬
around.
strategy

For example, changes in the environment

rather than changes in

might cause the turnaround.

The possible turnaround strategies include:
1)

the reversal of a big loss, such .as cutting losing departments.

2)

increasing deposits to increase investable funds.

3)

merging with other banks.

4)

controlling expenses.

5)

reorganizing.

6)

opening branches in growth areas.

7)

improving marketing programs.

8)

bringing in a new management team.

9)

bringing in a new system of management.

10)

changing the investment mix.

11)

expanding markets nationally or internationally.

12)

improving legal leverage.

13)

investment in new technologies

14)

investment in new business.

This list is not meant to be exhaustive; it has been developed through
discussions with management experts and through a review of the turn¬
around literature.

This study will identify those strategies used by

turnaround banks; the study should add to this a priori listing.

Identification of Sample and Definitions

The initial sample is drawn frcm Bank Compustat Tapes (see Appendix
for description).

Bank Compustat Tapes lists financial and operational
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variables for 136 banks.
through 1978.

The time period used in this study is 1939

Two categories of banks are identified.

gory of banks are called the decline group.
are called the turnaround group.

The first cate¬

The second category of banks

Decline banks are banks which have con¬

tinuously declined for three successive years and then at least two of
the next three years.

Turnaround groups are banks which have declined

for three successive years, and then grown for at least two of the next
three years (See Figure #1).
The first step in identifying the sample is the choice of classifi¬
cation variable.

Following the lead of Schendel and Patton, the classi¬

fication variable is net income.

While Schendel and Patton compared net

income to growth in GNP, this study compares growth in net income for a
bank to the industry-wide growth in net income.

If a bank's net income

grows at a higher rate than industry-wide net income, then that year is
called a growth year.

If a bank's net income grows at a lesser rate than

industry-wide growth in net income for a particular year, then that year
is labeled a decline year.
pattern over time.

This comparison normalizes the growth/decline

The comparison follows the logic that a bank which

has increased its net income at a rate less than industry growth in net
income has lost ground, while the bank that has grown faster than the
industry has gained ground.
Industry growth is computed through the use of aggregate data com¬
piled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

For each

year, the percentage increase in net income over the previous year is
computed.

This percentage

increase is then used to categorize each year

of performance for each bank as decline or growth.
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Figure 1
Graphic Representation of Turnaround

Net
Income

f

Years

Decline
Turnaround
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The classification of each year takes place through the use of a
transformed variable.

For each bank in the initial sample, the first

year's net income is used as the initial base period.

The first year

is then transformed to reflect the growth in net income for the entire
industry.
year.

The second year is then compared to this transformed first

More precisely,
XT = XY:

XT = transformed net income
X = net income
Y = growth in net income for industry

In the first year, the transformed net income is the base period.

For

each subsequent year, the net income is divided by the transformed net
income of the previous year.
then computed.

The natural log of this calculation is

A negative natural log indicates decline, while a posi¬

tive natural log indicates growth.

More concisely, this calculation is

as follows:
In (X/XT-1),

where X = the current year's net income, and
XT-1 = the transformed net income for the
previous year.

The results are visually inspected to detect desired patterns.

Banks

which exhibit three consecutive negative scores are classified as de¬
clining banks.

Thus, a decline is recorded where:

X^ < Xj_^T for three years.
This first period, three years of consecutive decline, will be called
"Phase 1".
All banks which exhibit the three years of decline are part of the
sample.

The problem focus of this study is the pattern over the next
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three years.
2",

For the second three years,

which shall be called "phase

there are eight patterns which can be observed.

The eight patterns

are as follows:
-(three years of decline, where
+ + + (three years of growth, where
~ + +

+ _ +
_
+-

-

+

-

-+

< X^_^T for three years)
> X^_jT for three years)

(inconsistent growth, where X- > X-_-,T for two of
three years)
1
1

(inconsistent decline, where X^ < X* FT for two of
three years)
1

The pure decline group is defined as the group which includes those
banks which have pure decline in phase 2.

These banks have gone through

a six year period in which their performance has declined relative to
industry performance.
The pure turnaround group is defined as the group which includes
banks which have pure growth in phase 2.

These banks have gone through

a six year period, which includes three years of decline followed by
three years of growth.
A second pair of groups will be formed.

Inconsistent decline banks

will be added to the pure decline group, while inconsistent growth banks
will be added to the pure turnaround group.

The expanded decline group

which is called the impure decline group, includes those banks which
exhibit pure decline, and those banks which interspace their decline with
one year of growth.

The underlying assumption in this classification

scheme is that the one year of growth is a random occurrence, since it
has occurred only in one year out of six, this seems reasonable.
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Similarly, the expanded turnaround group, which is called the impure
turnaround group, includes those banks which exhibit pure turnaround in
phase 2, and those banks which interspace the growth with one year of
decline.

The underlying assumption in this classification scheme is that

the turnaround strategies for the inconsistent turnaround banks have met
with partial success.

This classification method is similar to the clas¬

sification method used by Schendel and Patton.
For each bank in the sample group, financial and operating ratios
identified by Ford (1978) will be calculated for the six year period.
These variables have been chosen because they are representative of the
variables of interest to theorists of bank management.

The variables are

vl:
v2:
v3:

net income/average equity
return on earning assets
net interest income/eaming assets

v4:
v5:
v6:
v7:

operating expense/earning assets
overhead/earning assets
interest on deposits/all deposits
interest on deposits/time and savings

v8:
v9:
vlO:

net income/employees
payroll expense/employees
assets/employees

vll:
vl2:

gross loans/all deposits
cash and treasuries/dda (demand deposit accounts)

vl3:
vl4:
vl5:

loan income/gross loans
securities income/securities
municipal income/municipals

vl6:
vl7:

loan loss provision/eaming assets
gross chargeoffs/loans

vl8:
vl9:
v20:

equity/assets
loan loss coverage ratio
reserve loans
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v21:
v22:
v23:

asset growth
deposit growth
equity growth

The calculation of each variable is presented in the appendix.

Hypotheses and Methodology

The analysis is performed in four separate stages.

The first stage

of the analysis is an attempt to estimate the explanatory power of the
variables chosen for analysis.

The second step of the analysis is the

test of hypotheses generated about turnaround strategies.
of the analysis is the test of alternative hypotheses.

The third step

The fourth step of

the analysis is qualitative confirmation of the process.

We shall con¬

sider each step in order.

Testing the model.
model.

The first step in the study involves a test of the

The study assumes that variation in performance can be explained

by the variables chosen for analysis.

These variables have been tested

in other studies; they have been chosen only after a careful review of
the appropriate literature.

However, most studies that have used this

set of variables have had a different purpose than this study.

Ford

(1978) studied the differences between high performing and low perform¬
ing banks.

These banks may be different than non-turnaround and turn¬

around banks.

The device which will be used to test the power of these

variables is the regression model.
In the regression model, Y = BX + e, where Y is the dependent vari¬
able, B is beta, X is a T x (K+l) matrix, and e is an error term.

In

this particular model, Y is net income; X is a matrix of 23 independent
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variables.

B is estimated by the least squares method (throu^i the normal

equations) by the formula (X'X)-1 X'Y.

(Goldberger, 1964).

Given the estimate of b, we can then compute the vector of calculated
values of y, y, where y = Xb.

We can then calculate the vector of resid¬

uals, e, where e = y-Xb = y-y.

This calculation allows us to decompose

the total variance into two components:
and the variance due to error.

the variance due to regression,

Thus,

SST = SSR + SSE
SST = y'y - (i'y)2/T

SSR = b'X'y - (i'y)2/T
This gives us a "natural measure of goodness of fit," (Goldberger, 1964),
9

which is the coefficient of determination (cormonly called R ).
R2 = SSR/SST
An R

2

•

•

2

•

of 1 is a perfect fit, while an R

planatory power.

of 0 is indicative of zero ex-

2
The higher the R value, the higher the explanatory
*

power of the model.
A regression is run for each year of phase 1 and phase 2 for the
turnaround and non-turnaround groups.
regression.

2

A consistently high R

2

of the model; the high R
turnaround process.

2

The R

is then computed for each

offers confirmation for the power

confirms that these variables do explain the

The relative contribution of each variable cannot

be determined through the regression analysis because there is a high
degree of multicollinearity between the independent variables (for a dis¬
cussion of the effects of multicollinearity, see Kerlinger (1973)).

Hypotheses testing and methodology.

These hypotheses are tested on the

decline and turnaround groups which are pure cases, and on the expanded
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impure decline and impure turnaround groups.
Each hypothesis is presented with a brief discussion of the theory
which suggests the hypothesis, and the operational method for testing
the hypothesis.

Hypothesis #1:

The rate of decline of net income in turnaround firms will
be greater than the rate of decline of net income in nonturnaround firms during phase 1.

This hypothesis is based on the theory of Cyert and March (1963),
and the findings of Schendel and Patton (1976).
The hypothesis is tested through the use of t-tests.

The rate of de¬

cline is defined as the average percentage decline from the first to the

computed for each group.

The rate of decline is:

L

1

_1

The computation of average rate of decline is

—1
t—1X

third year of phase one.

J

*0

_X2 " Xl_

+

L

h J

+

*3" *2

L ^ J

X

= net income
for year n

If we call the rate of decline for company i D^, then the average
rate of decline for a group is:
n
rd = y
i=l

D.

l

n

The null hypothesis, Hq, is as follows:
Hq:

RD

= RDn, where RDt = rate of decline for turnaround group
RD = rate of decline for non-turnaround
n
group

H-:
i

RD. > RD
t
n

The null should be rejected at a .05 level of significance.
one-sided t-test, where the test statistic is:

This is a
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Xl-*2

Z =

Hypothesis #2:

The performance of the groups will be the same on the
financial and operating ratios for the decline phase
(phase 1)

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the turnaround banks
and the non-turnaround banks are equal performers during the decline
phase.
Performance is defined as a change overtime.

The average percentage

change for each of the 23 performance variables over the three period

of

decline will be computed:
Change in performance for V =

- V,

0

V,

0
3

If we call performance on variable

then the rate of change for each

group is

i = variable
j = company
The null hypothesis is as follows:
Hr,:
u

P. = P. , where P. = rate of change on performance variit
in'
it
able i for turnaround group

53

P^n = rate of change on performance vari¬
able for non-turnaround group
The null should be accepted at .05 level of significance.
two-sided t-test.

Hypothesis #3:

The test is a

The test statistic is as before.

The performance of the groups (turnaround and non-turn¬
around) is different on the financial and operating ratios
for phase 2.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the turnaround group
is different than the decline group in phase 2.

The turnaround group has

initiated strategies which are different than those followed by the nonturnaround group; the effect of these strategies should be observed in the
financial and operating ratios.
Performance is again defined as change over time.

The average per¬

centage change for each of the 23 performance variables over the threeyear period of phase 2 will be computed:
Change in performance for V =

3
Again, we call performance on variable i P^, the rate of change for each
group is:
n

P- •

I

41

j=l

J

i = variable
j = company
The null hypothesis is as follows:
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Hq:

= P^, where P^j. = rate of change on performance vari¬
able i for turnaround group
P^n = rate of change on performance vari¬
able i for non-turnaround group

The null should be rejected at the .05 level of significance.

The test

is a two-sided t-test; the test statistic is as before.

Hypothesis #4:

The two groups will not be discriminated successfully when
phase 1 of the turnaround group is compared to phase 1 of
the decline group.

The method of analysis to test this hypothesis is multiple discrim¬
inant analysis.

Discriminant analysis "finds a linear combination of the

p variables that gives maximum separation between the groups" (Frederick,
1975).

The assumption behind this hypothesis is that there is no differ¬

ence between the groups of banks during the decline phase.

The hypothesis

is partially based on the work of Schendel and Patton, who used separate
multiple regressions to analyze differences between stagnation and turn¬
around.
Multiple discriminant analysis:

"is a statistical technique used

to classify an observation into one of several a priori groupings depen¬
dent upon the observation's individual characteristics.

It is used pri¬

marily to classify and/or make predictions in problems where the depen¬
dent variable appears in qualitative form; e.g., male or female, bankrupt
or non-bankrupt.

Therefore, the first step is to establish explicit

group classifications.
more."

(Altman, 1968).

The number of original groups can be two or
In our case, the explicit group classification

is turnaround or non-turnaround.

In phase 1, the both groups are in
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decline.

Therefore, there should not be a successful discrimination at

this point.
The test of discrimination between the groups is Bartlett's chisquare approximation:
X2 = -(n-l-(p+g)/2) In A
where A= (1/1+Aj)
This methodology follows two assumptions:

one, that the dispersion

matrix of each group is equal; two, that the distribution of the under¬
lying population is multivariate normal.
The discriminant analysis will be run at year 1 of phase 1, and year
3 of phase 1.

Hypothesis #5:

The two groups will be discriminated successfully when
phase 2 of the turnaround group is compared to phase 2
of the decline group.

This hypothesis flows from the previous hypothesis.

While the groups

were similar during phase 1, during phase 2 a change occurred; that is,
the turnaround group has now entered a new trend, while the non-turnaround
group continues to decline.

The characteristics of this change should be

detected by the discriminant analysis.
The statistical methodology is the same as the methodology for the
previous hypothesis.

However, the discrimination should be successful;

Bartlett's chi-square should be significant.
This test will be conducted for year 1 of phase 2, and year 3 of
phase 2.
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Hypothesis #6:

Several variables will be more important than the other
variables in the discriminant function. Specifically,
variables operating expense/earning assets, overhead/
earning assets, interest on deposits/all deposits, net
income/employees, payroll expense/employees, assets/
employees, cash and treasuries/DDA, municipal income/
municipals will be among the variables that contribute
the most to the discriminating function.

This hypothesis is suggested by Ford's (1978) analysis of high per¬
forming banks.
This hypothesis will be tested through the use of discriminant
weights and discriminant loadings.

The discriminant analysis is run on

standardized data; the discriminant function is produced; then, discrim¬
inant scores are calculated.

These scores provide a relative measure of

the contribution of each variable in the discriminating process.
higher the score, the higher the contribution.

The

When the scores are listed

in rank order, the variables predicted to contribute the most will fall
within the top half of the list.

Discriminant loadings

relation between variables and the discriminant score

which show cor¬
will be computed

and inspected.
After the initial discriminant analysis, a reduced set of variables
is identified and used for further analysis.

The task of identifying

the most important discriminators within a set of collinear predictor
variables is a complex one, because there is no unambiguous answer to
the problem of collinearity (Green, 1978).

The options available in¬

clude dropping variables after inspection of the correlation matrix
(Green, 1978), the use of significance tests on the difference in
Mahalanobis distances between full sets and reduced sets of variables
(Rao, 1952), the use of partial F-tests (Klecka, 1975), the use of the
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structure matrix (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971), or the use of standardized
discriminant weights (Green, 1978).

The structure matrix is inspected

to assess discriminatory power of variables.

A reduced set of variables

is then chosen, and the discriminating effects of these variables are
tested on phase 2.
At this point, an attempt is made to assess the discriminatory con¬
tribution of each class of variables; profitability measures, expense
control measures, employee utilization measures, asset management mea¬
sures, etc.

An index is built for each class of variables through the

use of factor scores.

The factor scores are then used in a discriminant

analysis model, to assess the discriminatory power of each class of vari¬
ables .

Alternate hypotheses.

The assumption of this study is that the decline

and turnaround process is not independent of management action.

The de¬

cline occurs because management has made some strategic errors, and the
turnaround occurs because management has made successful strategic ad¬
justments.

This assumption may be in error.

It is possible that al¬

ternative explanations for the turnaround process exist.
The extraneous factors which have been proposed to explain declines
in performance include size, organizational structure, and local economic
conditions.
Large size may be an advantage, while small size may be a disadvan¬
tage.

The logic of this argument rests on the empirical phenomena known

as the experience curve (Boston Consulting Group, 1968).
size increases, production experience increases.

In general, as

This increase in
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experience leads to a decline in cost.

Due to cost advantages, the large

organization is more successful than the small organization.

In competi¬

tion, then, the small organization will decline regardless of the action
of management.
Organizational structure may impact bank performance.

The key dif¬

ferences in organizational structure in the banicing industry lie in the
difference between holding companies and unit banks.

Holding companies

are corporate organizations which own several banks, while unit banks
are independent of affiliation with any other banking units.

Several

theorists have addressed the issues of the impact of holding companies
on bank competition (Mayne, 1976); (Johnson and Meinster, 1975).

It is

possible that the unit bank is at a competitive disadvantage when com¬
peting with the holding company.

The competitive advantage accrues to

the holding company because of its ability to spread staff costs over
several banks.

Theoretically, the holding company will have better staff

productivity per bank.
Local economic conditions can impact bank performance through two
channels.
bank.

First, local economic conditions affect the portfolio of the

Its level can be decreased due to decreased business growth in a

particular region, and its risk can be increased due to a decline in
business activity unique to a region.

Second, a particular region may

have more competition than another region.

There might be more commer¬

cial banks in a particular region, and there may be more alternate sources
of funds for business

such as savings and loans or insurance companies.

High levels of competition can force management into expensive programs
which don't contribute significantly to an increase in revenue.

Such
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competition would reduce a bank's performance relative to the industry,
if the whole industry is not subject to the same conditions.
These alternative hypotheses are not exhaustive; there probably are
others.

However, these are the alternative hypotheses most often de¬

bated in the literature.

It would be impossible to exhaust the full

range of hypotheses within the parameters of this study.
The alternative hypotheses will be tested through the use of a re¬
gression model.

Hypothesis #7:

Extraneous variables (other than the 23 analyzed) will
have insignificant effects. The major extraneous vari¬
ables will be size, organizational structure, and re¬
gional economic differences. The effects of these
variables will be tested in a regression model, where
the extraneous factor is used as a blocking variable.
These tests will be run only if the extraneous factor
appears in the sample. The independent variances will
be net income and profitability measures.
Operationally, the test of significance is as follows:
Y=a+b1X1 +BX, where Y = income (net)

linn’

b-, = beta for blocking vari¬
able
X-i = the blocking variable
(X = 0 or 1)
b

= beta for n variables,
n
measures of profitability

Xn = n independent variables
The statistical test is a test of b^:
Hq*.
= 0.
expect to confirm null at .05 level of significance.

Qualitative support.

I

The statistical methodology for this study assesses

the effect of strategic response to decline.

The specific content of the

strategies are lost in numbers; the quantitative analysis shows results,
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but not the activities which precede these results.

The qualitative re¬

search will discover the strategies used by the banks which turned around,
and those which failed.
The qualitative research will take two forms.

First, a letter will

be sent to each bank in the sample to request information from the banks.
Second, an extensive search of the literature will be undertaken to re¬
view reports about the strategies of each bank in the sample.
The following chapter presents the results of the analyses.

CHAPTER

IV

PRESENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

This chapter reports the result of the statistical analysis.

The

results of each statistical test and test of hypothesis is presented in
order.

A discussion of the implications of the results appears in the

next chapter.

Sample Identification

The industry growth in net income serves as the variable of compari¬
son to determine if a bank has declined or improved in performance in a
specific year.

Annual data published by the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation serves as the source of information for this classification
method.

Table 6 lists industry income, the annual change in industry

net income, and the percentage change in industry net incane.
A growth in net income for each year for each bank occurs when the
bank's net income growth percentage exceeds that of the industry.

So,

growth in 1978 implies a growth greater than 21.2% over the previous
year; growth in 1977 implies a growth greater than 13.2% over the pre¬
vious year, and so on.

Ihe decision rule for identifying growth or de¬

cline is based on the calculation of the natural log of year n, divided
by the year (n-1), after year n-1 has been transformed to reflect indus¬
try growth.

Table 7 lists the calculations for each year.

The sample for the study is those banks which meet the decision rule
for decline.

The data used to identify the sample is the net income
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Table 6
Industry Net Income Figures
For U.S. Banks

Year

Net Income
(000's)

59

2,372,519

60

3,387,129

61

Change (From
previous year)

—

—

1,014,610

.428

42.8%

3,401,822

14,693

.004

.4%

62

3,260,178

-141,644

-.042

-4.2%

63

3,379,546

119,368

.037

3.7%

64

3,431,832

52,286

.015

1.5%

65

3,543,895

112,063

.033

3.3%

66

3,714,246

170,351

.048

4.8%

67

4,319,012

604,766

.163

16.3%

68

4,692,982

373,970

.087

8.7%

69

4,334,567

*see note

70

4,837,293

502,726

.116

11.6%

71

5,236,205

398,912

.082

8.2%

72

5,654,398

418,193

.080

8.0

73

6,579,194

924,796

.164

16.4%

74

7,091,264

512,070

.078

7.8%

75

7,254,611

163,347

.023

2.3%

76

7,843,277

588,666

.081

8.1%

77

8,879,405

1,036,128

.132

13.2%

78

10,759,534

1,880,129

.212

21.2%

Note:

—

Percentage Change
(from previous year)

As of 1/1/69, there was a change in the financial reporting sys¬
tem from a cash to an accrual basis. Therefore, a valid measure
is not available for the increase from 1968 to 1969. The effects
of this change on the make up of the sample are discussed in the
appendix.
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Table 7
Calculations of Decline/Growth
Rates in Net Income for U.S. Banks
formula
Growth over
(+ is growth,
Year_previous year- is decline)
78

21.2%

nl (78ni/77 x 1.212)

77

13.2%

nl (77ni/76 x 1.132)

76

8.1%

nl (76ni/75 x 1.081)

73

2.3%

nl (75ni/74 x 1.023)

74

7.8 %

nl (74ni/73 x 1.078)

73

16.4%

nl (73ni/72 x 1.164)

72

8%

nl (72ni/71 x 1.08)

71

8.2%

nl (71ni/70 x 1.082)

70

11.6%

nl (70ni/69 x 1.116)

69

see note

nl (69ni/68 x 1)

68

8.7%

nl (68ni/67 x 1.087)

67

16.3%

nl (67ni/66 x 1.163)

66

4.8%

nl (66ni/65 x 1.048)

65

3.3%

nl (65ni/64 x 1.033)

64

1.5%

nl (64ni/63 x 1.015)

63

3.7%

nl (63ni/62 x 1.037)

62

-4.2%

61

.4%

nl (61ni/60 x 1.004)

60

42.8%

nl (60ni/59 x 1.428)

Note:

nl (62ni/61 x

Growth from 68 to 69 could not be determined (See Table 6 ) •
fore, declines are absolute declines in reported net income.
effects are discussed in the appendix.

.958)

There
The
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reported by banks on compustat tapes for the period 1959 through 1978.
One hundred thirty^six banks report their performance on the compustat
tapes.
however.

Some banks have a history of less than twenty years on the tapes,
The following chart reports the breakdown of the compustat

tapes according to the number of years reported by member banks.

Table 8
Sunmary of Years Reported
on Bank Compustat Tapes
Number of banks

Number of years reporting

10
1
63
9
3
9
9
2
14
4
7
3
_2

20
18
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6

n = 136
Source:

Compustat Tapes.

The data base expands over time (in 1959, there are 20 companies report¬
ing; in 1961, there are 11 companies reporting; in 1963, there are 74 com¬
panies reporting, etc.).

This lack of stability in the data base used

to generate the sample builds a bias into the decision rule, in that turn¬
arounds will be more likely in latter years.

This bias is unavoidable,

in that there is no substitute data base available.

This lack of stabil¬

ity will not cause bias in the analysis of turnaround strategies.
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The following sample serves as the basis for the remainder of the
study.

The banks are reported by group:

The Names

Table 9
and Periods of Turnaround by Category of
Banks in Sample

Pure Turnaround Banks
Bank Name
Midatlantic Banks
Union Planters Corp.
United Virginia Bancshares
Detroit Bancorp.
Society Corp.
Union Commerce Corp.
Colorado National Bancshares
Mercantile Texas Corp.

Period of Turnaround
1972-1978
1971- 1977
1972- 1978
1969- 1975
1970- 1976
1966-1972
1972-1978
1971- 1977
(n=8)

Inconsistent Turnaround Banks
Bank Name

Period of Turnaround

Chemical N.Y.
Continental Illinois Corp.
Mellon National Corp.
Northern Trust Corp.
Fidelity Union Bancorp
First Empire State
First Penn Corp.
Hospital Trust Corp.
New England Merchant's
United Bancorp of N.Y.
First Maryland Bancorp
Maryland National Corp.
Huntington Bancshares
National Detroit Corp.
Pittsburgh National Corp.
Union National Bank Pittsburgh
Liberty National Corp.
Republic of Texas Corp.
Texas Conmerce Bancshares
Bankamerica Corp.
First Hawaiian Inc.
Hawaiian Bancorp Inc.
Western Bancorporation

1970-1976
1965-1971
1969- 1975
1970- 1976
1970-1976
1972-1978
1972-1978
1972-1978
1970- 1976
1971- 1977
1971-1977
1970-1976
1970-1976
1969- 1975
1970- 1976
1969-1975
1969- 1975
1970- 1976
1964-1970
1960-1966
1971- 1977
1969- 1975
1970- 1976
(n=23)
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Pure Decline Banks
Bank Name

Period of Turnaround

Shawmt Corporation
Baybanks, Inc.
Greater Jersey Bancorp
Hartford National Corp.
Lincoln First Banks
Marine Midland
Equimark Corp.

1969-1975
1969-1975
1971-1977
1969-1975
1969-1975
1969- 1975
1970- 1976
(n=7)

Inconsistent Decline Banks
Bank Name

Period of Decline

State St. Boston Corp.
CBT Corp.
Girard Corp.
Philadelphia National Corp.
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Financial General Bankshares
First Union Corp. (N.C.)
General Bancshares
Indiana National Corp.
Southwest Bancshares
Bancal Tri-state Corp.
Crocker National Corp.
Security Pacific Corp.

The total sample size is 51.

1969-1975
1969-1975
1969- 1975
1971- 1977
1972- 1978
1971-1977
1971- 1977
1970- 1976
1972- 1978
1972-1978
1971- 1977
1969-1975
1969-1975
(n=13)

There are 31 banks which had turnarounds,

and there are 20 banks which had declines.
in 1969 and later for 48 of the 51 banks.

The period under study starts
The performance of each bank

for the period of interest is presented in the appendix, along with a
narrative history of each bank for the applicable period.
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Report of Results

For each bank in the sample, performance measures over the period of
turnaround or decline are taken from the corapustat tapes.

These vari¬

ables are then used to compute the variables of interest for the study.
The variables are:
Cash and due from banks
U.S. treasury notes and securities
IXie for banks (memo entry)
Total investment securities
Trading account securities
Federal funds sold and securities purchase
with agreements to resell
Loans (gross)
Total assets (gross)
Total demand deposits
Total deposits (worldwide)
Time and savings deposits
Reserve for bad debt losses
Preferred stock (par value)
Total book value
Interest on fees and loans
Interest on state and town obligations
Total interest and dividends on investments
Aggregate loan and investment revenue
Trading account income
Interest on due from banks
Number of employees
Salaries and wages of officers and employees
Pension and employee benefits
Total interest on deposits and borrowings
Provision for loan losses
Total interest expense
Aggregate other current operating expenses
Total current operating expenses
Current operating earnings before expenses
Net income
Net credit or charge to reserves for debt
recovery
Average taxable investment
Average non-taxable investment
Average deposits: time and savings
Average deposits: demand
Total savings and deposits
Total time deposits
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The variables used in the study are:
Profitability Measures
vl)
v2)
v3)

net income/average equity
return on earnings assets
net interest/earning assets

Expense Control Measures
v4)
v5)
v6)
v7)

operating expense/earning assets
overhead/earning assets
interest on deposits/all deposits
interest on deposits/time and savings

Employee Utilization Measures
v8)
v9)
vlO)

net income/employees
payroll expense/employees
assets/employees

Asset Management
vll)
vl2)

gross loans/all deposits
cash and treasuries/demand deposit accounts

Revenue Enhancement
vl3)
vl4)
vl5)

loan income/gross loans
securities income/securities
muni income/munis

Credit Quality Control Measures
vl6)
vl7)

loan loss provision/earning assets
gross chargeoffs/loans

Leverage and Loss Coverage
vl8)
vl9)
v20)

equity/assets
loan loss coverage ratio
reserve/loans

Growth Measures
v21)
v22)
v23)

asset growth
deposit growth
equity growth
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The definitions of the compustat variables, and the calculations of the
variables of interest, are explained at length in the appendix.

The 23

variables are analyzed through the remainder of the study.

Regression.

The twenty three variables which are used to study the turn¬

around process have proven successful as explanatory variables in other
studies (Ford, 1978), but have not been used in the context of this type
of study.

In order to assess the explanatory power of these variables

for this study, a regression analysis is performed.
signed to explain the turnaround process.

Hie research is de¬

Due to high levels of multi-

collinearity, the regression model cannot be used for the analysis of the
turnaround process.

However, it is used to assess the power of the 23

performance variables to explain the variance in net income among the
groups.
The groups under study are turnaround and non-turnaround groups.
Each bank in the sample is analyzed through a. six year period.

Ihe re¬

gressions are run on all data, all groups for all years of the study;
then, on the data for the turnaround and decline groups for separately,
for the six years of the study; then, on each group for each year of the
study: first year, second year, third year, fourth year, fifth year, and
sixth year.
The first two sets of regressions present no special computational
problems.

Ihe results are presented in Table #10.
o

There are problems in the calculation of the R
data in both the decline and turnaround groups.
milticollinearity.

for each year of

Ihe problem is due to

In the event of high multicollinearity, the data
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matrix can not be inverted.

Recall from the previous chapter that the

beta coefficient is estimated by the formula (X'X)-^^.

With high mul¬

ticoil inearity, the X'X matrix is singular; it can not be inverted.
estimate of beta can be made; thus, no R

can be computed.

can be solved by purging the data of multicollinearity.

No

This problem

One method of

purging the data of multicollinearity is through the use of principal
components.
Table 10
Regressions:

All Data, Turnaround Group, and Decline Group

Sample

R2

All data

.51802

Turnaround group (six years)

.61088

Decline group (six years)

.78943

Principal components transforms the original data into a data set of
orthogonal variables.

These new variables are a linear transformation of

the original data set which do not suffer the problem of multicollinearity.
This transformed data set can be used as predictors in the regression
model without any loss of predictive efficiency (Tatsuoka, 1971).

Princi¬

pal components computes a new variable, Y, through the use of the trans¬
formation matrix V:
Y = XV
Where Y is an n by p matrix, X is an n by p matrix, and V is a p by p ma¬
trix.

In the pure principal components model, the number of components

is equal to the number of variables.

Data reduction can take place by
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retaining only the meaningful components.
proposed to choose "meaningful" components:
chosen is / of variance explained.
of the variance.

Many decision rules have been
in this context, the rule

Sixteen components represent 94.3%

Since the last seven components contribute only mar¬

ginally to the variance, they are dropped from the subsequent analysis.
Thus, for each year, a regression is run on the transformed data ma¬
trix.

The results of these regressions are listed on Tables 11 and 12.
Table 11
Principal Components Regression on Each Year of
Turnaround Sample

Year of Turnaround
year
year
year
year
year
year

R2

1
2
3
4
5
6

.52988
.66159
.79958
.69036
.82265
.65102

Table 12
Principal Components Regression on Each Year of
Decline Sample
Year of Decline
year
year
year
year
year
year

1
2
3
4
5
6

R2
.79604
.98652
.87664
.93850
.95558
.86354

The variables do explain a substantial proportion of the variance in
net income.

Subsequent analysis assesses the process of turnaround.
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Hypothesis test:

V

Rate of decline.

The hypothesis is:

RDj- ~ RDnJ where RDt - rate of decline for the turnaround group
RE>n - rate of decline for the non-turnaround group
H :
a

RD

t

> RD
n

The rate of decline in net income is computed as follows:

X1 -*0

*2

X1

X,

*0

.

+

*2

X3

*2

Xn - net income for
year n

The test is run on the mean rate of decline for pure decline and turn¬
around groups, and on the mean rate of decline for the full decline and
turnaround groups.
The following table records the results of the t-tests on the pure
groups.
Table 13
Tests of Rate of Decline (Pure Groups)

Group

n of cases

X

Decline

7

.0073

Turnaround

8

-.3680

t-value

1.22

DF

One-tailed prob.

7.02

.131

The following table records the results of the t-tests on the full
sample (pure and impure groups).
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Table 14
Test of Rate of Decline (Impure Groups)

Group

n of cases

Turnaround

31

-.0959

Decline

20

.0034

t-value

DF

One-tailed prob.

-1.21

30.57

.1185

While the differences are in the hypothesized direction, neither tvalue is significant at the hypothesized level of acceptance.

The t-value

is an approximation, calculated by the formula:

This approximation is necessary because the groups do not have equal vari¬
ance.

In a test for equality of variance, the null hypotheses that the

variance are equal is rejected (for pure groups, F = 868.43, significant
at the .000 level; for impure groups, F = 161.91, significant at the .000
level).
Hypotheses test:

Performance ratios.

Phase 1 is the period of decline

during the first three years of the six year period under study.

For

each bank, performance ratios are calculated for seven years; the base
year (Xq) , and the six subsequent years (X-^ through X^).
defined as a change in any ratio over time.
A for period phase one is:

Performance is

Thus, performance for ratio
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T-tests are calculated to assess differences in mean performance for the
pure groups (decline vs. turnaround), and for the full sample (pure groups
and inconsistent cases, decline vs. turnaround).
The following table reports the results for pure groups, phase 1.
Table 15
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values and Significance for
Phase 1: Pure Groups
decline
Variable_Group Mean

Turnaround
Group Mean

T-value

Sig.

-.0380
.0431
-.0409
.0332

-.5031
.1167
.0439
.1505

1.23
-1.42
-2.53
-2.01

No
No

.0065
.2914

.2140
.2542

-2.18
.38

.3501

.1726

2.33

-.0359
.0643
.1070
-.0056
.0465

-.4572
.0675
.0020
.0136
.0007

1.26
-.27
4.85
-.89
1.119

-.0147
.0223
-.0078
.1847

.1052
.0892
.0042
.7007

-3.42
-2.50
-2.53
-2.29

.4761
-.0873
-.1027
-.0688
.1516
.1528
.0472

.2442
-.0182
-2.1205
.0054
.0736
.0637
.0513

.52
-2.93
1.08
-1.48
3.29
4.15
-.21

*1
vl '
v2
v3
v4

net income/average equity
return on earning assets
net interest/earning assets
operating expense/earning
assets
v5
overhead/eaming assets
v6
interest on deposits/all
2
deposits
v7Z
interest on deposits/
^
time and savings
v8
net income/employees
v9
payroll expense/employees
vlO*^ as sets/employees
vll
gross loans/all deposits
vl2
cash and treasuries/demand
deposit accounts
vl3
loan income/gross loans
vl4
securities income/securities
vl5,v-> municipal income/municipals
vl6' loan loss provision/eaming
assets
vl7
gross chargeoffs/loans
vl8Vc-. equity/assets
vl9l| loan loss coverage ratio
v20' reserve/loans
v21
asset growth
v22.v, deposit growth
V23'1 2 equity growth
1)
2)

Approximation: separate variance estimate.
Invalid due to sample size (1).

001
05

1

A A

A

A

No
A

No
No
/\ A 4\

No
No
^i«.
A

4\ A

4\ A
•.»A

No
A A

No
No
4\ A

A A A

No
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The variables which are significantly different are:
v3:
v4:
v5:
v7:
vlO:
vl3:
vl4:
vl5:
vl6:
vl8:
v21:
v22:

net interest inc/eaming assets
operating expense/eaming assets
overhead/eaming assets
interest on deposits/time and savings
assets/employees
loan income/gross loans
securities income/securities
municipal income/municipals
loan loss provision/earning assets
equity/assets
asset growth
deposit growth

The Table #16

lists the results on phase 1 for the whole sample.

The variables which are significantly different are:
v5:
v7:
vlO:
vl5:
v22:

overhead/eaming assets
interest on deposits/time and savings
assets/employees
municipal income/municipals
deposit growth

These variables were also significant for the comparison of pure groups.
The implications of these differences are discussed in the next chapter.
Phase 2 is the last three years of the period under study.
all banks in the sample declined during phase 1

relative to industry

wide performance as measured by growth in net income,
ing phase 2 is different for the groups.

While

performance dur¬

Pure groups exhibit three

straight years of decline or growth, while the full sample includes banks
with pure records of performance, and banks which exhibit growth or de¬
cline in two of three years. Two years of decline classifies a bank in
the decline group, while two years of growth classifies a bank in the
growth group.
time.

Performance is again defined as a change in a ratio over

Thus, performance for ratio A for period phase two is:
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Table 16
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values, and Significance
for Phase 1, Impure Groups

Variable

vl

1

v2
v3
v4
v5‘
v6
v7
v8
v9
vlO
vll
vl2
vl3
vl4

vl5i

vl6J

vl7]
V18-,

vl9;
V201

v21
v22
v23
1)

net income/average equity
return on earning assets
net interest/earning assets
operating expense/earning
assets
overhead/earning assets
interest on deposits/all
deposits
interest on deposits/
time and savings
net income/employees
payroll expense/employees
assets/employees
gross loans/all deposits
cash and treasuries/demand
deposit accounts
loan income/gross loans
securities income/securities
municipal income/municipals
loan loss provision/earning
assets
gross chargeoffs/loans
equity/assets
loan loss coverage ratio
reserve/loans
asset growth
deposit growth
equity growth

beeline
Group Mean

Turnaround
Group Mean

T-value

Sig.

-.0518
.0923
.0026
.0692

-.1749
.0776
-.0005
.0951

-1.23
-.49
-.09
.91

No
No
No

.0297
.2849

.0887
.2189

1.71
-1.54

.1896

.0956

-1.92

-.0335
.0721
.1000
.0013
.0571

-.1784
.0659
.0459
.0160
.0290

-1.25
-.71
-2.71
1.13
-1.12

.0344
.0478
.0041
.2659

.0522
.0511
.0283
.4447

.72
.17
1.81
1.22

.3650
-.0517
-.0460
-.0568
.1236
.1184
.0580

1.3278
-.0304
.1451
-.0235
.0978
.0908
.0598

1.04
1.37
.25
1.67
-1.50
-1.76
.22

Approximation based on separate variance estimate

*** = .001

Table 17 reports the results for pure groups, phase 2.

Nn
«.!*

No

No

No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
A

No
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Table 17
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values and Significance for
Phase IUd, Pure Groups

Variable
vl1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7i
vS1
v9
vlO
vll
vl2
vl3
vl4.
vlb1
vl6-,
vl7X
vl8n
V191
v20-,
v21j
v22:
v23X

1)

Itecline Group Mean

Turnaround
Group Mean

T-Value

-.38S7
.1023
.0346
.1263
.1719
.1524
.1137
-.3129
.0791
.0348
-.0083
.0955
.0860
.0742
.0788
.6049
.5068
.0114
-.1046
-.0544
.0238
.0404
.0300

2.0761
.0176
.0262
.0169
.0118
.0381
.0235
2.3151
.0785
.0790
.0126
.0712
.0137
.0357
.0505
-.0670
.3500
-.0246
2.9741
-.0619
.1391
.1281
.0514

-1.08
2.19
1.05
2.41
2.35
1.74
1.56
-1.03
.03
-2.35
-.99
.67
1.96
1.56
.95
3.46
.38
.92
-1.09
.18
-1.76
-1.33
-.39

t-approximation based on separate variance scores.

Sig.
No
4\

No
A A

A A

No
No
No
No
A A

No
No
%.»A

No
No
4\ A

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

*** = .001

The variables which are significantly different are:
v2:
v4:
v5:
vlO:
vl3:
vl6:

return on earning assets
operating expense/earning assets
overhead/earning assets
assets/employees
loan income/gross loans
loan loss provision/eaming assets

The next table lists the results on phase 2 for the whole sample.
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Table 18
Performance Ratios: Means, T-values and Significance for
Phase Two, Impure Groups

Variable
vl1
v2
v3
v4
v5l
V61
v7l
V81
v9
vlO
vll
vl2
vl3-.
v14L
vl5
vl6
vl7
vl8-,
vl9X
v20
v21n
v227
v23L

1)

Decline Group Mean

Turnaround
Group Mean

T-Value

-.1226
.0686
.0478
.0828
.1257
.1131
.0853
-.0475
.0824
.0422
.0126
.0519
.0491
.0558
.0574
.5028
.5109
.0056
.0095
-.0622
.0587
.0596
.0564

.4717
.0316
.0277
.0434
.0509
.0545
.0164
.5681
.0847
.0590
-.0020
.0992
.0277
.1085
.0530
.3442
.5467
-.0048
.7480
-.0685
.1021
.0974
.0760

1.08
-1.58
-1.26
-1.60
-2.47
-1.36
-1.74
.95
.21
1.41
-1.41
1.85
-.97
.99
-.26
-1.04
.16
-.64
1.19
-.31
1.80
1.61
1.15

t-test approximation based on separate variance estimate.

Sig.
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
/>

No

.001
.05

.1
The variables which are significantly different are:
v5:
vl2:
v21:
v22:

overhead/eaming assets
cash & treasuries/demand deposit accounts
asset growth
deposit growth

V5 (overhead/eaming assets) is the only variable which is significantly
different during phase 2 for both the pure group and full sample compari¬
son.

It is also the only variable which is significant during all com¬

parisons (phase 1 and phase 2).
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The original hypothesis of the study states that there would be no
difference in performance during phase 1, while there would be signifi¬
cant differences during phase 2.

This hypothesis is rejected.

There are

significant differences during both phase 1 and phase 2; there are more
differences in phase one.

The implications will be discussed in the next

chapter.

Discriminant Analysis

Discriminant analysis on Phase 1.

Phase 1 is the first three years of

performance for each bank in the study.

By definition, each bank has

declined relative to industry performance in net income growth.

By def¬

inition, there should be no difference between the groups, turnaround and
decline, in phase 1.

Differences should begin to appear in phase 2, the

last three years of performance.
The test for differences between the groups during phase 1
ing phase 2

is discriminant analysis.

and dur¬

As previously stated, discrimi¬

nant analysis seeks a linear combination of variables which achieves max¬
imum separation between the groups.

The assumptions of the method are

that the dispersion of the groups are equal, and that the data is nultivariate normal.

There is some debate about the second assumption;

Eisenbeis and Avery (1972) argue that nonnultivariate normal data may be
used in discriminant analysis without biasing the results significantly.
Discriminant analysis serves several purposes.

First, it provides

a set of weights which can be used to classify cases into one group or
another.
tion.

In a general sense, this can serve for description or predic¬

Given a previously unanalyzed observation, a researcher can use
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the classification function developed in a discriminant analysis study
to classify that observation, subject to an error rate.
provide standardized discriminant coefficients.

Second, it can

The magnitude of these

coefficients give some indication of the relative contribution of each
discriminating variable.

In a general sense, given two groups with five

discriminating variables, if a particular coefficient is twice as large
as any other coefficient, then that larger coefficient contributes more
to the differences between the groups (Klecka, 1974).

There are problems

with this method of interpretation, in that the standardized coefficients
do not take into account correlation between the original variables
(Perreault, Behrman, and Armstrong, 1979).

The effects of this problem

will be discussed in a later section of the study.

Finally, the discrim¬

inant analysis procedure provides a test for the significance of differ¬
entiation between the groups.
The hypothesis for phase 1 states that there will not be significant
discrimination between the groups during phase 1.

The methodology chosen

to test this hypothesis is direct discriminant analysis, as programed in
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Nie, et al., 1975).
At this initial stage of analysis, all variables are entered into the dis¬
criminant function.

If there is significant discrimination, the struc¬

ture correlation matrix, which provides the correlations between the dis¬
criminant function and the discriminating variables is then used to iden¬
tify the most important discriminators.

This reduced set is then used in

the next step of the analysis, to further judge the discriminatory power
of this reduced set.
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The tests are run on pure groups and impure groups for the beginning
and the end of phase 1, that is, the first and third year of the period
of study.

The following table presents the Wilk's lambda and its cor¬

responding test of significance.

The Wilk's lambda is a measure of the

success of discrimination between the groups.

Table 19
Discriminant Analysis on Phase 1:
Pure and Impure Groups

Group

Year

Wilk's Lambda

Significance

Pure

1

.0938245

.2882

Pure

3

.1369178

.4421

Impure

1

.4946657

.7212

Impure

3

.1691671

.0563

Note:

In the analysis of pure groups, the tolerance parameter is .0005;
in the analysis of impure groups, the tolerance parameter is .001.
This reduction in tolerance was necessary to force more variables
into the pure discriminant functions.
At this point, a further test of the hypothesis that there is no dif¬

ference between the groups is performed on the impure groups at the third
year.

This is the Chow test (Kmenta, 1971), which is a test for the sta¬

bility of the beta coefficients across groups.

The null hypothesis for

this test is:

The acceptance of the null hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the
beta coefficients across groups are stable; therefore, the groups are from
the same population.

The test statistic is:
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(ssec-sse1-sse2)/ic
(SSE1"+SSE2)7n1+n2-2K

where SSEc is the sum of squares resi¬
dual for the combined groups
SSE^ is the sum of squares resi¬
duals for the nth

group

n-^ and n2 is the n of observations
in groups 1 and 2
K is the number of observa¬
tions
The results of this test confirm the results of the discriminant analy¬
sis; the computed F-statistic is .615, which is not significant.

Thus,

the hypothesis that there is no difference between the groups during phase
1 is supported.

Discriminant analysis on Phase 2.

The hypothesis for phase 2 states that

there will be significant differences when a discriminant analysis is
performed on phase 2.
tests.

The following table presents the results of these

The tests are performed on the pure and impure groups, for the

fourth and sixth years.
As in phase 1, a further test is performed on the impure groups dur¬
ing the sixth year to ascertain if there are differences between the
groups.

The test is the chow test, as in the previous section.

The F-

statistic is 6.101, which is significant at the .05 level.
An inspection of the results table reveals that there are signifi¬
cant differences in discrimination for the impure groups throughout phase
2, and for the pure groups during the fourth year.

Thus, the hypothesis

is confirmed for the impure groups, and partially confirmed for the pure
groups.
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Table 20
Discriminant Analsyis on Phase 2:
Pure and Impure Groups

Group

Year

Wilk's Lambda

Significance

Pure

4

.02939202

.0386

Pure

6

.0467443

.1047

Impure

4

.1807332

.0146

Impure

6

.2194888

.0098

Note:

In the analysis of pure groups, the tolerance parameter is .0005;
in the analysis of impure groups, the tolerance parameter is .001.
This reduction in tolerance was necessary to force more variables
into the pure discriminant functions.

The major purpose of this study is the analysis of differences in
performance between banks that have turned around, and those that have
failed to turnaround.

To this point, the discriminant analysis has con¬

firmed that there are differences between the impure groups in phase 2
(years 4 and 6), and in pure groups during year 4.

The next step is to

identify those variables which contribute the most to discrimination.
Since the impure groups exhibit consistent discrimination, they will be
subjected to further analysis.
An approach which is often used to identify the contribution of each
variable in a discriminant analysis model is the use of standardized co¬
efficients.

Perreault, Behrman and Armstrong (1979) argue that this ap¬

proach can be quite misleading because the standardized coefficients do
not account for the correlations between the predictors.

If two predic¬

tors are higjhly correlated, the discriminating power of those predictors
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may be split between them; therefore, the standardized coefficients would
be small.
A second common approach used to identify the most important pre¬
dictors is the use of partial F-tests.

The partial F-test is a stepwise

procedure in which a one way analysis of variance is performed on the
full set of discriminating variables for the groups; that variable which
has the highest F is the first variable used as a discriminator.

Then,

the F-tests are recomputed with the initial entry variable serving as a
covariate.

The variable with the highest F on this second test is then

entered, and the analysis of variance is recomputed with the two previously
entered variables serving as covariates.

This series of stepwise partial

F-tests continues until all variables with F-values greater than a pre¬
determined limit are entered into the discriminant function.

This method

suffers difficulties under the presence of multicollinearity; as the step¬
wise precedure continues, the value of the F for a particular variable
will fluctuate, because of the variable's correlation with other vari¬
ables .
The twenty three variables of this study do exhibit collinearity.
Therefore, the use of standardized variables or partial F-tests to choose
a reduced set of variables is not the appropriate one.

Following the

arguments of Perreault, Behrman and Armstrong (1979), the correlations
between the predictor variables and the discriminant function are used
to identify the most important variables.
The ten variables with the highest correlation are then used as in¬
dependent variables in a discriminant analysis.

Their power is tested

through the use of the Wilk's lambda, and their classification performance.
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The discriminatory power of the next variable, the variable in
the original model which has the eleventh highest correlation with the
discriminant function) is assessed through the use of the test of sig¬
nificance of the difference in Mahalanobis distance between the two
models.

The test is as follows:

m - m - 1

n - p

C(D2

- D2 )
p'

_____
n

m-,nu

where c = ssFzy

1 + CDZ

mi =

sample size of group 1

= sample size of group 2
m =

total sample

n = # of predictors in full set
P = # of predictors in reduced
set
D

2
n

= Mahalanobis distance for n
predictors

D

2
P

= Mahalanobis distance for p
P
predictors

The following table presents the matrix of correlations between the
discriminating variables and the discriminant function for the impure
groups years 4 and 6.

The ten variables which provide the highest cor¬

relation serve as the discriminators for the remaining discriminant analy¬
sis.

For the fourth year, these variables are:

net income/employees,

interest on deposits/all deposits, assets/employees, loan loss coverage
ratio, equity/assets, gross loans/deposits, return on earning assets, net
income/average equity, securities income/securities, and overhead/earning
assets.

For the sixth year, these variables are net income/employees,
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Table 21
Correlations Between Discriminant Functions and
Discriminating Variables for Impure Groups, Phase 2

Sixth Year

Fourth Year
v8

.19223

v8

.36809

v6

.16742

v5

-.35952

vlO

.14351

v4

-.35497

vl9

-.12875

v21

.31535

vl8

.12166

vl6

-.30664

vll

.11236

vl7

.30583

v2

.10006

v23

.26363

vl

.09044

vl

.24830

vl4

.08684

vl5

.21985

v2

-.21769

v5

-.08400

v9

.06838

vl8

.19250

v?

.05979

vlO

.18622

vl3

.05599

v22

.18125

vl5

-.05482

vl3

-.16819

v3

-.03795

v7

-.15920

vl9

-.12421

v23

.03434

v22

-.02829

v9

.10174

vl7

-.01932

v3

-.10063

v20

-.01492

v6

-.04986

vl6

.01119

vl2

.04795

v4

.00987

v20

.03621

v21

.00764

vl4

-.03372

vl2

-.00450

vll

-.01783
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overhead/earning assets, operating expense/earning assets, asset growth,
loan loss provision/earning assets, gross chargeoffs/loans, equity
growth, net income/average equity, municipal inccme/municipals, and re¬
turn on earning assets.

Discriminant analysis on the reduced set of variables.

This section de¬

scribes the process of testing a reduced set of predictor variables.
The ten most important variables are tested for significance in discrim¬
ination

as measured by the significance of Wilk's lambda,

and the re¬

sults are presented.
There is a full presentation of the results for the significant
functions.

In addition to the Wilk's lambda, the canonical correlation

coefficient is presented.

This is a measure of correlation between the

discriminant function and the dummy variables which represent group mea¬
surement.

Then, the classification functions are presented.

There are

two functions, each of which follows the form:
DS = c. .X•,
ij ik

where DS is a discriminant form on case i
c.. is the coefficient for the variable
k in function j
Xik is the k independent variables for
case i.

Each case is classified by computing its discriminant scores; it is
assigned to that group in which it scores highest.

Following the clas¬

sification functions, the standardized discriminant coefficients are pre¬
sented.

This is followed by presentation of the correlations between the

predictor variables and the discriminant function.

This is followed by
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a presentation of the results of classification.

The final test listed

in each case is the result of the Box's M test, which is a test for the
equivalence of covariance matrices between the groups.
Two problems are inherent in the preparation of these results.
first problem is the bias in classification results.

The

When the classifi¬

cation function is used to classify the same data that was used to con¬
struct the function, there is an optimistic bias in the results.
happens because the sample is used to classify itself.

This

In the case of

large samples, the hold-out method can be used to eliminate this bias.
In the hold-out method, a subset of the original data sample is held out
during the construction of the classification functions.

This reduces

the bias since the sample held out for classification is classified by
a function which has been generated from another sample.

In this par¬

ticular study, the hold-out method is not possible because of the small
sample size (51 cases in the largest groupings).

Another method vhich

reduces the bias in classification is the Lachenbruch method (Lachenbruch
and Mickey, 1968).

In this method, classification takes place through

an iterative procedure.
the sample.

As each case is classified, it is held out from

A classification function is constructed without the case

to be classified, and then used to classify the case.
sample is subjected to the same procedure.
sults are obtained in a less biased method.

Each case in the

Thus, the classification re¬
This is the method employed

by this study, through the use of the Bio-medical data processing pack¬
age.

Classification results by both methods are presented; the classifi¬

cation results obtained by the Lachenbruch method are the less biased
results.
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The second problem inherent in the preparation of the results is
the problem of missing data.

There are twenty three independent vari¬

ables across six years for each company.

In some instances, data for

one variable in a particular year may be missing.

The packaged programs

do not allow for missing data in the process of building the classifica¬
tion functions, although SPSS will classify cases with missing variables.
For each run, the n of cases may be reduced in the process of building
classification functions; the reduction in group size is due to missing
data.
The results of the analysis of the fourth year are presented first;
these will be followed by a presentation of the results of the analysis
on the sixth year.
The ten most important predictors in the fourth year did not dis¬
criminate successfully when used alone.

The ten variables produce a

Wilk's lambda of .5954113, which is not significant (the significance
is .1131).

In this case, more predictor variables are added to the ten

in an attempt to gain successful discrimination.

The remaining variables

are added to the predictor variables in order of their rank in the struc¬
ture correlation matrix; as they are added, their contribution to dis¬
crimination is tested through the use of an F-test which tests for sig¬
nificant differences in Mahalanobis distance.

If there is a significant

difference in Mahalanobis distance, then the added variables do contribute
to discrimination, and should be included in the analysis.
The tests for the contribution of the remaining variables indicate
that the addition of several variables to the reduced set of ten vari¬
ables does not contribute significantly to successful discrimination.
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First, three variables (payroll expense/employees, interest on deposits/
time and savings, and loan income/gross loans) are tested for additional
discrimination.

These three variables rank eleventh, twelfth, and thir¬

teenth in terms of correlation with the discriminant function.

Second,

four variables are tested for additional discrimination (municipal income/
municipals is added to the previous group of three variables); then a set
of five variables is tested for additional discrimination (net income/
earning assets is added to the list; this variable ranks fifteenth in
the correlation matrix).

The F-statistics and the appropriate degrees

of freedom for each test are:
addition of three variables

2.618

3,23

addition of four variables

1.916

4,22

addition of five variables

1.512

5,21

In each case, the F is not significant at a level of .05 significance.
At this point, further testing of additional sets of variables for dif¬
ferences in discrimination is terminated for two reasons; first, the six¬
teenth variable, equity growth, has a correlation of .03434 with the dis¬
criminant function.

This correlation is low; it is not reasonable to

expect that the addition of this variable would offer substantively dif¬
ferent results than the addition of the previous variables.

Second, the

aim of the study is to identify the most important characteristics of the
differences between the turnaround and decline groups.

A model of six¬

teen or seventeen variables would not offer much better description than
a model of twenty three variables.

The fact that it is difficult to build

a reduced mudel of discrimination in the fourth year is not surprising.
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At this point in time, the sample banks have just begun the turnaround.
The effects of this effort appear at a later stage (that is, at year
six).
The classification functions, standardized coefficients, and classi¬
fication performance of the full set of twenty three variables is pre¬
sented on Table #22.
For the sixth year, the ten predictors variables performed well.
They produced a Wilk's lambda of .4358903, which is significant at the
.05 level (significance of .0017).

The full set of results for this

analysis is presented on Table #23.
The addition of additional variables does not add significantly to
the discrimination provided by these ten variables.

In a test of the

differences in Mahalanobis distance, the difference added by the eleventh
variable, vl8 (equity/assets), is not significant.

The test of the dif¬

ference added by the eleventh and twelfth variable (equity/assets and
assets/employees) is not significant.

The difference added by the next

five variables (equity/assets, assets/employees, deposit growth, loan
income/gross loans, and interest on deposits/time and savings) is not
significant.

The appropriate F-statistics and their degrees of freedom

are as follows:
addition of the eleventh variable

1.872

1,29

addition of the eleventh and
twelfth

1.549

2,28

addition of eleventh through
fifteenth variable

.64

5,25

The ability of the ten variables used to discriminate is confirmed.

These

variables provide the basis for analysis of the turnaround process pre¬
sented in the next chapter.
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Table 22
Full Set of Predictors of 4th Year, Impure Groups;
Discriminant Analysis Results
Wilk's Lambda:
Canonical Correlation:

.1807332
.9051336

Sig.:

.0146

Classification Functions
Turnaround
vl
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
v9
vlO
vll
vl2
vl3
vl4
vl5
vl6
vl7
vl8
vl9
v20
v21
v22
v23
(constant)

-179.1437
21761.60
30807.72
5862.585
-8710.018
-37880.55
-326.5968
2.222433
8.896036
.1364018
1674.960
348.0551
12474.96
-459.0847
657.3229
-34911.50
-17490.26
6642.754
-.07082744
10250.75
-79.12942
-112.3703
39.73829
-1212.173

Decline
44.62549
23112.58
-31735.12
4575.558
-8222.437
-36310.80
-625.8414
-4.447415
9.931354
.1453683
1602.135
308.0456
12674.52
-245.1863
634.1490
-33190.96
-19282.35
7352.675
-1.637793
8307.480
38.96393
-211.6190
88.61458
-1233.946

Standardized Discriminant Coefficients
vl
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
v9
vlO

2.06803
3.34598
-1.92102
-4.17855
.81107
4.43454
-1.65960
-4.68766
.36261
.73854
(continued)
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Table 22 (continued)

vll
vl2
vl3
vl4
vl5
vl6
vl7
vl8
vl9
v20
v21
v22
v23

-1.61944
-2.90999
.47829
.47431
-.13891
1.20361
-1.66500
1.89638
-2.65084
-1.30506
2.62659
-2.09732
.50824

Classification Matrices
Without Bias Correction

Lachenbruch Method

Predicted

Predicted

Actual

1

2

1

16

1

2

0

20

% correctly classified

97.3

1 - decline
2 = turnaround
Box's m:

could not be computed

Actual

1
2

1

2

12
9

5
11

/ correctly classified

62.2
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Table 23
Reduced Set of Predictor Variables:
Wilk's Lambda:
Canonical Correlation:

Sixth Year, Impure Group

.4358903
.7510724

Sig.:

.0017

Classification Functions
v8
v5
v4
v21
vl6
vl7
v23
vl
vl3
v2
(constant)

Decline

Turnaround

1.621612
374.0923
196.3570
41.49195
6.897981
-124.2870
67.72046
-23.23303
2803.889
1227.104
-135.8100

1.563296
186.3944
117.3750
56.84478
550.1231
546.5059
84.94623
-21.13189
3045.806
1335.434
-146.6344

Standardized Discriminant
Coefficients

Correlations Between
Disc. Function and Variables

v8
v5
v4
v21
vl6
vl7
v23
vl
vl5
v2

v8
v5
v4
v21
vl6
vl7
v23
vl
vl5
v2

.09427
.47353
.43212
-.51845
-.72795
-.77552
-.46402
-.06291
-.44302
-.45245

-.61015
.59595
.58841
-5.2274
.50830
-.50695
-.43701
-.41160
—.36444
.36086

Classification Matrices
Lachenbruch Method
Predicted

Without Bias Correction
Predicted

Actual

1
2

1
14
3

2
2
22

% correctly classified

Actual

1
2

1
11
6

% correctly classified

87.8

1 = decline
2 = turnaround
Box's M

160.53

2
5
19

F:

2.0331

Sign.:

.0000

73.2
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In the sixth year, the test of equal covariance between the groups,
the Box's M statistic, finds statistical significance.

Since the null

hypothesis of this test is that the covariances are equal, the null mist
be rejected.

In essence, the data violate the assumption of equal dis¬

persion among the groups.

However, this violation may not be serious.

Miile it is often suggested that the use of the quadratic discriminant
function is more appropriate under these conditions, there is some evi¬
dence that the linear function is satisfactory if the dispersion matrices
are not too different (Lachenbruch, 1975).

Furthermore, with a different

sample size and a large number of variables, there is a conservative bias
in the test.

The null hypothesis is frequently rejected when the groups

are in fact of equal dispersion.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that

the use of linear discriminant analysis is appropriate.

Discriminant analysis on factor scores.

The process of comparing twenty

three performance variables is, at best, unwieldly and at worst, impos¬
sible.

The reduced number of variables lends simplicity to the data by

finding a subset of the data which captures the difference between the
groups.

Since the performance variables are grouped into eight differ¬

ent classes, another approach to simplifying the analysis is available.
This approach involves the construction of an index to represent each
group of variables, and then using these indices as independent variables
in the discrimant analysis.

This approach is attempted and the results

presented in this section.
A method for building indices is the use of factor analysis.

Fac¬

tor analysis is the general name for a wide ranging number of techniques
which can be used to analyze data.

The method used in this specific
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approach is principal factoring (Kim, 1975).

Principal factoring involves

the construction of factors through the principal components.
is equivalent to the method discussed in a previous section.

The method
A trans¬

formation matrix is constructed which will transform the original data
into a new data set, which is a linear extension of the first data set.
This new data set is composed of uncorrelated independent variables.
Each case can be scored through the use of these new independent vari¬
ables .
Mathematically, the factor score matrix, F, is:

1/2

-

F = (ZV)L

, where Z = original data in standard form
V = the transformation vector
L = dispersion matrix of transformed vari¬
ables

In the context of this study, the index is built on each group of
variables, for the first factor.

The first factor captures the major

portion of the variance in the original data; it can be used without loss
of a major portion of the explanatory information.

The indices are built

as follows:
Profit Index
F- = (Z.V.)L"1/2, where F- is the score of the ith case
i

i J

1

Z^ is the standardized observation for
the ith case on variables one, two,
and three (net income/aver, equity;
return on earning assets; net intern¬
es t/eaming assets)
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Vj is the transformation vector for the
first factor
L is the variance of the first factor.
Expense Control Measure Index:

This index is built from the vari¬

ables :
operating expense/earning assets
overhead/earning assets
interest on deposits/all deposits
interest on deposits/time and savings
The employee utilization index is built from the variables which
measure employee utilization; the asset management index is built from
the variables in the asset management class, and so forth.
eight indices are built, to compute eight scores.
to compute the scores are listed on Table #24.

A total of

The coefficients used

For each index, the per¬

cent of variance captured by the first factor is also listed.
These factor scores are then subjected to a discriminant analysis.
The purpose of the discriminant analysis is twofold:

first, to confirm

that there is discrimination between the decline and turnaround groups
during phase 2 (this is entirely equivalent to our original hypothesis);
second, to ascertain which scores contribute the discriminatory power.
Since these scores reflect performance dimensions, any score which con¬
tributes to discrimination in the turnaround process is an area of prac¬
tical concern for the management which may attempt to enact a turnaround.
The discriminant analysis on the factor scores of the pure groups is
significant for year three (at the .05 level).

For the impure groups,

the discrimination is significant in years three, four, and six.

The
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Table 24
Eight Indices Constructed from 23 Variables and the
Coefficients for each Variable

Index

Variables

A Variance
captured
by first
factor

Coefficients

Profit

Net income/average equity
Return on earning assets
Net in teres t/eaming assets

46.1

-.36232
+.59824
+.48362

Expense
Control

Operating expense/earning
assets
Overhead/earning assets
Interest on deposits/all
deposits
Interest on deposits/
time & savings

52.7

+.47082

Employee
Utilization

Net income/employees
Payroll expense/employees
Assets/employees

62.2

+.41594
+.34080
+.49706

Asset
Management

Gross loans/all deposits
Cash and treasuries/demand
deposits

52.0

-.69350
+.69350

Revenue
Enhancement

Loan income/gross loans
Securities income/securities
Municipals income/municipals

44.8

.59532
.45952
.42332

Credit Quality
Control

Loan loss provision/earning
assets
Gross chargeoffs/loans

92.7

+.51935

Leverage and
Loss Coverage

Equity/assets
Loan loss coverage ratio
Reserve/loans

47.2

+.56198
-.24003
+.57653

Growth

Asset growth
Deposit growth
Equity growth

71.5

+.44147
+.44246
+.27506

+.34651
+.36207
+.03453

-.51935
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successful discrimination in year three is contrary to previous results
and may be due in part to the reduced variance of the factor scores.
The discriminant analysis on the full data set, and the chow test, indi¬
cate that the groups are the same in year 3.

The classification success

of the impure groups is 72.1% in year six in a classification by the
Lachenbruch method.
The results of the discriminant analysis on the factor scores for the
sixth year analysis on impure groups are presented on Table #25.
results are chosen for full presentation for three reasons:

These

first, they

represent the major focus of interest for this study; second, in terms
of level of significance (significant at .01 level), they represent the
best discriminatory model; third, given the performance of the full and
reduced sets of predictor variables, year 6 of the impure groups provides
the most information about the turnaround process.

Tests of Alternative Hypotheses

While the twenty three performance variables analyzed through the use
of t-tests and discriminant analysis explain much of the variation in
performance between the groups of banks, they can't explain all the vari¬
ation in performance.

These performance variables are variables which

management can directly control through strategic choice.

There are var¬

iables which are beyond the control of management, which may contribute
to the decline or turnaround process.

While it would not be possible to

test all the extraneous factors which might impact performance, there
are some factors which can be tested.

The factors which may impact per¬

formance are regional economic conditions, size of the bank, and structure
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Table 25
Discriminant Analysis on Factor Scores:
Sixth Year, Impure Groups
Wilk's Lambda:
Canonical Correlation:

.5454251
.6742217

Sig.:

.0042

Classification Functions
Decline
Profit index
Expense control index
Employee use index
Asset mgt. index
Revenue mgt. index
Credit Q.C. index
Leverage & loss index
Growth index
(constant)

Turnaround

-.10008
.6230481
.410944
-.03198
1.623009
1.208532
-1.358098
-.3961221
-2.860673

Standardized Discriminant
Coefficients
Profit index
Expense control index
Employee use index
Asset mgt. index
Revenue mgt. index
Credit Q.C. index
Leverage & loss index
Growth index

-.1980206
-.1746864
1.039799
-.00489839
2.885811
.283031
-.6523558
.7276484
-2.313965
Correlations Between
Disc. Function and Variables

.0559
.29655
-.40984
-.01543
-.40309
.38939
-.27888
-.37674

Expense control index
Credit Q.C.index
Growth index
Employee use index
Profit index
Leverage & loss index
Revenue mgt. index
Asset mgt. index

.69495
.68215
-.59620
-.56623
.56191
-.34441
.14281
.12267

Classification Matrices
Lachenbruch Method
Predicted

Without Bias Correction
Predicted

Actual

1

2

1

16

1

2

6

20

% correctly classified

Actual

1
2

1

2

12
7

5
19

% correctly classified

83.7

1 = decline
2 = turnaround
Box's M

88.96

F:

1.9089

Sig.:

.0011

72.1
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of the bank.

The hypothesis is that these extraneous factors will not

have a significant effect on the net income of the sample banks for the
period of the turnaround.

The test of the hypothesis is a durrmy regres¬

sion model, where net income is the dependent variable, and the indepen¬
dent variable is a dunroy variable which represents economic regions, or
bank structure.

The test of the hypothesis for bank size is a regression

of asset size against net income.

Net income is an imprecise measure, as

net income which is large for a small bank is small for a large bank;
therefore,

tests are also run with profit measures as dependent variables.

The profit measures are:

net income/average equity, return on earning

assets, and net in teres t/eaming assets.
The study adopts the taxonomy of the Compustat tapes to operation¬
alize regional economic conditions.
system are divided into five regions:
southwestern, and west coast.

Banks which report to the Compustat
eastern, southeastern, midwestern,

While this division is arbitrary, the

division does represent much of the character of the regions that each
bank performs in.

The tests run herein do not address the differences

between the regions for that is beyond the scope of this study.

They only

serve to test for the presence of differences.
The study adopts a single variable to analyze the impact of bank
structure.

Banks can either be unit banks, wherein the corporation con¬

trols one bank; or multi-bank organizations, wherein the corporation
owns all or most of many banks, each of which has its own management
structure.

The categorization of a bank is based on a review of its

history as reported in Moody's, and/or a review of its annual reports.
This structural alternative is beyond the control of management in the
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banking industry because of the impact of state banking laws.

Some state

banking laws sanction the multi-bank holding arrangement, while others
don't.

Traditional studies which assess the impact of bank structure on

performance compare the performance of unit banks to holding companies.
This particular study is different in that the entire sample consists of
holding companies.

In the context of this study, the unit structured

bank is one which has only a single domestic bank within the corporate
umbrella.

The corporation has other companies (leasing companies, etc.),

and in some cases, interests in foreign banks.
The study adopts asset size as a measure of the bank's size.

There

are other measures available, such as deposit size, earnings, number of
employees, or number of branches.

Asset size is a popular measure of

bank size; it should closely correlate with all measures of bank size.
One option for analyzing the effect of asset size on performance is to
group banks by size, such as small vs. large banks, or small vs. medium
vs. large.

This grouping might be accomplished through the use of arbi¬

trary break points in groups at the median or at quartiles.

Since the

banks in this study are all large in comparison to the majority of com¬
mercial banks, this discrete grouping procedure is not advantageous.
Therefore, a dumny variable is not used to test this hypothesis.
The results of these tests are reported on Table #26.
Regional difference account for some of the variation in performance
on net income and net interest/earning assets.

Given recent attention to

the problems of decline in the north and east, and the growth of the sun
belt, the finding that there is some difference in performance presents no
surprise.

The rather weak explanation that regional differences provide

103

Table 26
Results of
Tests of Alternate Hypotheses

A) Regional Conditions
Dependent Variable

R2

Sig.

Sig. Betas

Net income/average equity
Return on earning assets
Net interest/earning assets

.02995
.01434
.15533

.044
.325
.000

East, southeast

Net income

.19299

.000

Southeast, midwest
southwest
East, southeast,
midwes t, sou thwes t

R2

Sig.

Sig. Betas

.00230
.02995
.0032
.00582

.388
.002
.746
.169

R2

Sig.

.00027
.00927
.13719
.92142

.769
.083
.000
.000

—

B) Structure
Dependent Variable
Net income/average equity
Return on earning assets
Net interest/earning assets
Net income

—

Structure
—
—

C) Size
Dependent Variable
Net income/average equity
Return on earning assets
Net interest/earning assets
Net income

Sig. Betas
—

—

Asset size
Asset size
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for performance confirms the ability of management to achieve turnaround
even in regions that are not as conducive as others.
Several caveats are necessary in presenting the results of this
test.

First, the nature of the test compares each region to a base re¬

gion, which in this case is the west.

Where the test finds differences,

it is only differences by pairwise comparison to the west region.

Cer¬

tainly, further tests could be made, but they are beyond the scope of
this study.

Second, the differences do not suggest that the process of

turnaround and decline matches regional borders.
turnaround banks in each region.

There are decline and

In general, both the geographic distri¬

bution of declines and the results of this test confirm that the north
and east presented tougher problems for bankers than the south and west.
But there were turnarounds in the tough regions, and there were declines
in the growth regions.

The following table presents the number of de¬

cline banks and turnaround banks by region:
Decline
East

Turnaround

10

8

Southeast

3

4

Midwest

3

i0

Southwest

1

5

West

3

4

This test also provides no means for assessing the exact nature of the
differences within the regions; surely, the differences could be internal
to the banks, as well as in external events.
The test of the impact of structure show that on only one measure
dues structure have any impact on the performance variables, and for that
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measure the impact is minimal.

For seme reason, return on earning assets

is related to structure, but the relationship explains only a small por¬
tion (2.9%) of the variance.
The test of the influence of asset size shows that the asset size
impacts the net interest/earning assets profitability measure, and net
income.
sive.

The explanation for the influence on the former variable is elu¬
The explanation for the impact of asset size on net income is read¬

ily apparent; as the size of a firm increases, its net income should also
increase.

Since this increase in net income does not always lead to an

increase in profitability, the impact of size is not a central issue in
this study.

Indeed, the lack of relationship between size and the first

two measures of profitability confirm that size is not a major factor in
the turnaround process.
The results of these tests lead to a cautious acceptance of the hy*pothesis.

The extraneous factors tested do not explain the turnaround

process.

They may impact the turnaround process in some minor ways, but

they are not the major explanatory factor in the process.

CHAPTER

V

DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the findings pre¬
sented in the previous chapter.

The discussion starts with preliminary

comments about the sample, and then proceeds to consider the key find¬
ings of the statistical analysis.

Ihe purpose of this chapter is to pre¬

sent a picture of the decline and turnaround process, as described
through statistical analysis.

The next chapter will present the results

of a review of literature on each of the sample banks, in an attempt to
compare qualitative and quantitative findings.

The qualitative analysis

includes the reports of management at the time of the turnaround; these
reports should prove valuable aids to the research.
This chapter includes four sections:

first, a discussion of the

sample; second, a discussion of the results of analysis on phase 1; third,
a discussion of the results of the analysis on phase 2; finally, a sum¬
mary.

The Sample

The sample is limited to large banks.

This only presents a problem

if the results of the study are generalized to small banks.

The findings

of this study can only be used accurately to assess the turnaround proc¬
ess in large banks.
The sample is well distributed geographically.

While there is a

large concentration of eastern banks, this concentration may not be
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unusual in that there are more eastern banks represented on the Compustat
tapes than any other region.

There are both decline banks and turnaround

banks in every geographic region.
The time factor of the decline and turnaround process is interesting.
All but two of the banks in the sample entered their decline after 1969.
The sparsity of declines in the earlier years of the study indicate that
the banking industry or the economy may have changed in the late sixties
in some way.
1978).

This has been suggested by many authorities (e.g., Baker,

After a period of uninterrupted economic growth accompanied by

relatively stable interest rates, a new period of slower growth inter¬
rupted by recession and accompanied by large variations in the interest
rate changed the pattern of the banking industry.

These changes, generic

in part to the banking industry, were accompanied by the overall growth
in social demands that affected banks as well as other industries.

In

theoretical terms, the environment might have changed from a stable to a
turbulent one (Emery and Trist, 1965).

While it is beyond the scope of

this study to analyze the differences over time, these differences do sug¬
gest that the results of this study may be limited to times of turbulence.
The fact that the turbulence did not affect all banks in the same manner
supports the contention that there is something to learn from those banks
that did turnaround.
The results of the regression

2

in terms of the R

suggest that the

variables chosen for this study do capture a substantial proportion of
the variance in net incane performance.

2

The R

with the best performance in the impure groups.

are consistently high,
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Phase 1

Rate of decline.

The hypothesis that there would be a significant dif¬

ference in rate of decline between the two groups was not supported.

The

difference was not significant at a meaningful level of statistical sig¬
nificance.

However, there is an interesting phenomena to observe here.

The study defined decline as a relative decline in net income.

Perform¬

ance for each bank is compared to industry performance, and thus defined
as decline or growth.

In the sample groups, the banks which turnaround

have absolute rates of decline; -36.8% for the pure groups, and -9.59%
for the impure groups,

while the banks which don' t turnaround have rela¬

tive rates of decline; that is, their net income increased, but at a rate
slower than that of the industry; for pure groups, net income of decline
banks increased .73% while in impure groups the increase was .34%.

While

the difference is not statistically significant, this finding suggests
that management does not react to relative performance declines as quickly
as it does to absolute declines.
industry average, is still growth.
more often than absolute decline.

Slow growth, even if it is slower than
Slow growth is accepted and tolerated
Absolute decline may be the shock which

spurs management into action.

Phase 1 t-tests.

Contrary to initial hypotheses, there are some differ¬

ences in mean performance between the groups.

A discussion of the analy¬

sis of pure groups is presented, followed by a discussion of the analysis
of impure groups.
For pure groups, there are many significant differences in the per¬
formance of the independent variables.

These differences were tested
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through the use of t-tests; performance was defined as change in the in¬
dependent variables over time.
The profitability measure of net in teres t/eaming assets improves
for turnaround banks on phase 1, while it declines for the decline group.
However, while net interest performance is improving, the non-interest
expenses of turnaround groups are climbing more quickly.

Operating ex-

pense/eaming assets and overhead/eaming assets both increase irore dra¬
matically for the turnaround groups than for the decline groups.
est expense

as measured by interest on deposits/time and savings

Inter¬
is in¬

creasing for both groups, but at a slower rate in the turnaround group.
The turnaround groups have much slower increase in employee utilization,
as measured by assets/employees.

In the area of revenue enhancement,

the turnaround groups are outperforming the decline groups.

Loan income/

gross loans is declining for the decline group, and increasing for the
turnaround group.

Municipal income follows the same pattern.

While

securities income is growing for both groups, it is growing more quickly
for the turnaround group.

The turnaround groups are apparently suffering

mere loan losses, as the loans loss provision/eaming assets ratio in¬
creases at a greater rate for the turnaround groups.

The equity/assets

ratio declines for both groups, but it declines more dramatically for the
non-turnaround group (this group is increasing leverage at a faster rate).
Both assets and deposits grow at a slower rate for the turnaround groups.
The pure turnaround groups during phase 1 is improving its revenue
performance, but non-interest costs are growing at a rate which counter¬
acts the improved revenue performance.
tributing to the decline in performance.

In addition, loan losses are con¬
Decline groups are increasing
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assets and deposits faster than turnaround groups, but this increase does
not result in a better record of performance in revenue enhancement.
However, costs are not increasing as dramatically for the decline group
as they are for the turnaround group.
For the impure groups, a similar performance picture emerges, al¬
though the number of significant differences between the groups declines.
The turnaround group's expenses for overhead are increasing more quickly
during phase 1, while-their expenses for deposits are increasing less
quickly.

There is a slower growth in assets/employee for the turnaround

groups, there is a greater increase in municipal income, and there is
slower deposit growth.
While both groups have declined during phase 1, there are some dif¬
ferences in performance even at this early stage of the turnaround proc¬
ess.

Given the fact that these differences are unexpected, and complex,

we can only suggest what they might be based on the previous analysis.
Banks which will turnaround can attribute their decline to cost control
problems.

They might also contribute their decline to credit quality

control problems.

They generate revenue at a better rate than the de¬

cline banks, while the decline banks are increasing the level of assets,
and deposits, but not improving their margins on this increased volume.
A clearer picture of these unexpected performance differences should
emerge after a consideration of the phase 2 performance in the next sec¬
tion.
Even though there are differences in some performance trends during
phase 1, the turnaround and decline groups are not different at this
point.

The discriminant analysis shows no significant differences between
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the groups during year 1 and year 3, when the twenty three variables of
performance are analyzed.

Phase 2

During phase 2, there are several differences between the decline and
turnaround groups, as hypothesized.

The performance differences that ap¬

peared in the groups during phase 1 begin to reverse themselves.

This

section will compare the performance differences between the decline and
the turnaround groups during phase 2, while also comparing some of the
results of phase 2 to phase 1.

A discussion of the t-tests on the pure

groups precedes a discussion of the t-tests on the impure groups.

Then, a

discussion of the discriminant analysis for the impure groups is presented.
The t-tests on performance measures for pure groups show several dif¬
ferences.

Return on earning assets is increasing at a faster rate for

the decline group than for the turnaround group.

This is a surprising

situation, unless we consider the performance in phase 1, when the turn¬
around groups had better performance on a different profit measure.

Ap¬

parently, the turnaround groups improve their profit performance early in
the decline; the decline groups react later.

While they are improving

at a better rate than the turnaround group, this performance is too late
to counteract the decline.
The expense control performance sheds further light on this recov¬
ery process.

Operating expense/earning assets and overhead/eaming

assets are increasing at a greater rate for the decline groups.
a complete reversal of phase 1 performance.

This is

As with the turnaround

groups in phase 1, the increased expenses for the decline groups in phase
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2 counteract any gains made in revenue performance.

This comparison is

confirmed by observing performance on the loan income/gross loans ratio.
The decline group is improving performance at a better rate than the
turnaround group.
on this measure.

During phase 1, the decline group was deteriorating
They have now reversed this decline, but do not see

the returns from this reversal during phase 2.
The employee utilization measure, assets/employees, displays a sinrilar reversal.

During phase 2, the turnaround group is increasing per¬

formance on this measure at a greater rate than the non-turnaround group.
When considered in conjunction with the behavior of operating expense,
this suggests that the turnaround process requires some investment before
the turnaround begins.

Initially, this investment contributes to further

decline, but bears returns in the form of a turnaround later on.

Whereas

during phase 1, asset growth had been slower for the turnaround group,
now the rate of asset growth is statistically equivalent for both groups.
Perhaps the change can be attributed to the utilization of employees.
The final measure which reflects differences on t-tests between the
pure groups is the rate of growth in the loan loss provisions.

This

measure is increasing for the decline group, and decreasing for the turn¬
around group.

This is, again, a reversal of trends from phase 1.

The

turnaround group is improving its quality control, while the decline
group is just beginning to experience quality control problems.
In the analysis of performance trends for phase 2 for the impure
groups, a similar pattern appears, although not quite as dramatically
as in the pure group case.

The decline groups suffer a higher level of

growth in operating expense/earnings assets; this is a reversal of the
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phase 1 trend (however, the difference in phase 1 appeared in overhead
rather than operating expenses).

Deposit growth over this three year

period is higher for the turnaround group than for the decline group;
again, this is a reversal of the pattern.

Asset growth is higher for the

turnaround group than for the decline group, while cash & treasuries/
demand deposit accounts grow at a faster rate for the decline group.

The

higher rate of growth in cash and treasuries might explain the lower net
interest margin of the decline group as these are not highly profitable
uses of money.
The discriminant analysis of the sixth year impure group provides a
concise comparison of the differences between the groups.

This discrim¬

ination was successful when a reduced set of ten predictor variables was
used.

The variables which provided the most correlation were:

net in¬

come/employees, overhead/eaming assets, operating expense/earning assets,
asset growth, loan loss provision/earning assets, gross chargeoffs/loans.
These variables ranged in correlation from .50693 to .61015 (absolute
values).

The structure correlation matrix for the full set of ten vari¬

ables can be found on Table #23.
For each of these important variables, the group means provide in¬
sight into the differences between the groups.

Turnaround banks have

higher net income per employee than decline banks; they have lower over¬
head and operating expenses.

The turnaround banks have higher asset

growth during the sixth year than decline banks; their loan loss provi¬
sions are lower, as are their gross chargeoffs.

Less important (but

still distinctive) differences are found in the equity growth, net in¬
cane/average equity, municipal income/municipals, and return on earning

114
assets variables.

The turnaround group of banks have better performance

on three of these variables.

Somewhat surprisingly, the turnaround banks

have a slightly lower average return on earning assets.

This finding of

lower return highlights the importance of expense control and loan qual¬
ity variables.

Sumnary

In order to sumnarize the results of the findings to this point, it
is useful to present an analysis of the factor scores for the sixth year
of the turnaround.

The factor scores lend simplicity to this process

because they present the discriminating power of each group of variables,
rather than each individual variable.

Table #25 lists the results which

this discussion relies on.
The most important discriminating groups of variables
their correlation with the discriminant function

are:

as judged by

expense control,

credit quality control, growth, employee utilization measures, and profit
measures.

These results, combined with previous analysis, indicate the

importance that expense control measures and quality control of the loan
portfolio lend to the turnaround process.
One way of comparing these groups is by a consideration of their mean
scores on the discriminant function.
troids.

These scores are called group cen¬

The group centroid for the decline group is 1.10244, while the

group centroid for the turnaround group is -.72083.

By comparing the

signs of the group centroids with the signs of the standardized coeffi¬
cients, we can build a profile of the difference between case in each
group.

The signs of the standardized variables are as follows.
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Profit index

+

Expense control index

+

Employee utilization

-

Asset management index
Revenue management index
Credit q.c. index

+

Leverage and loss index

+

Growth index

+

Banks which score high on the employee utilization measures, the asset
management measures, and the revenue management measures while scoring
low on the profit index, which reflects the previous finding about the
lower return on earning assets in turnaround groups,

the expense control

index, the credit quality control index, which implies good quality con¬
trol,

the leverage and loss index, and the growth index are turnaround

banks.

Banks which score low on the employee utilization asset manage¬

ment and revenue management index while scoring high on the remaining in¬
dices are decline banks.

If we restrict attention to the most important

predictors, we can assert that the difference between the groups lies in
the fact that turnaround banks have low overhead and operating expense,
and have low levels of loan losses, while the decline banks do not.

Since

these differences are not evident during phase 1, the turnaround banks
successfully implemented cost control and credit quality control strate¬
gies.
The following chart sumnarizes the process of the turnaround.

This

chart combines the findings of the t-tests and the discriminant analysis.
The chart lists the 10 variables which were found to discriminate the
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Table 27
Pattern of Means for Key Discriminators
of Turnaround and Decline

- Turnaround Banks
1 = Significant difference in phase 1 or 2.
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impure groups during the sixth year, and traces the mean performance of
the impure groups throughout the six years of study.

The statistically

significant performance trends for phase 1 and phase 2 are noted.
chart captures the process of turnaround graphically:

The

the fact that many

of the trend changes for the turnaround group appear in years three and
four of the decline suggest that the turnaround strategy requires early
identification, and that it takes time to enact the turnaround.
The foregoing discussion of the statistical analysis reflects the
complexity of the turnaround process.

The next chapter presents the re¬

sults of a review of the literature to ascertain management's perception
of the turnaround process.

Before this review, a restatement of the re¬

sults of this chapter will prove useful.

First, the decline and turn¬

around banks are statistically equal during the first phase.

Certain

performance trends are different for the turnaround banks in the first
phase, however.

The turnaround banks recognize loan losses early in the

stage of decline.

They also recognize income improvements early in the

decline, but they experience a growth in expenses that outweighs their
income gains.

During the turnaround, this experience is reversed.

The

turnaround banks slow their growth in income generation, but their ex¬
penses decline.

The banks that continue to decline experience loan losses

and increases in expense.

The key components in the turnaround effort

are the control of expenses and the control of loan quality.

CHAPTER

VI

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter presents an in-depth review of the history of the sam¬
ple banks during the six year period of the study.

The major source of

the information developed in this chapter is the material supplied by
the banks.

Each bank in the sample was asked to supply copies of their

annual report for the period of the decline and turnaround.
the banks were requested to supply any other information:

In addition,
staff reports,

published articles, etc., that might be available in their libraries.
The response rate was as follows:
Table 28
Response Rate of Sample Banks to Inquiry
Total

Response

Percent

Pure turnaround

8

5

75%

Pure decline

7

6

71.4%

Inconsistent turnaround

23

4

17.3%

Inconsistent decline

13

8

61.5%

The response rate was much higher for the pure groupings than for the im¬
pure groupings.

Since perfect response was not expected, this informa¬

tion was supplemented by a review of the banking literature to analyze
published reports about the experience of the banks.
The information presented herein must be accepted with caution.
can be argued that annual reports and published reports do not reflect
the true conditions of the performance of each bank.
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In some cases,

It
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the annual report may serve more as public relations than public informa¬
tion.

Since the report is subject to reviews by such client audiences

as auditors, the board of directors, stockholders, and public agencies,
there is some control over the content of the document.

The matched

analysis of the subjective discussion of the firm's performance with the
objective performance data of this study improves the potential for de¬
veloping a true picture of the firm's position.

The Strategies Developed for Turnaround

Based on a review of the annual reports, a wide range of strategies
appears pertinent to the effort of reversing declines.

These strategies

appear on Table #29; this section defines each of the strategies.

The

following section compares the differences in strategies between the de¬
cline and turnaround group.

The strategies are presented in order of

their frequency of appearance.
The most frequently used strategies are the development of a new struc¬
ture and the use of cost controls.
several forms.

The new structure can take any one of

In some cases, the new structure adopted is the holding

company structure.

In other cases, the new structure is the change from a

multi bank holding company to a single bank holding company.

In many

cases, the change in structure involves a redefined reporting relation¬
ship within the corporate structure.

Certain operations such as market¬

ing and/or loan policy are centralized through the mechanism of an office
in corporate headquarters which reports directly to the chief executive
officer.

In many cases, the new structure is designed to meet the market

environment; the structure is organized on the basis of geography or on
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Table 29
Frequency Count of Strategies
Enacted During Phase 1 and Phase 2
as Reported by 'turnaround and Decline Banks

New structure
Cost controls
New business
Reduct ion in problem loans
Marketing
Reduction in personnel
Acquisition
Targets
Plans
Control of loan risks
Credit rat ioni,ng/decrease
sensi t i vi Ly
Now branches/nrplace branches
New const jnmr services
New markets
tntemat ionai expansion
Rrjst rict ing growth
New technology in operations
Change market del initLon
New liead man
I J<w manngrjw'nt team
Increase d/mand ckjposits
relative Lo time k savings
Increase staffing
Inr reased service charges
Merge branelu'S
Liquidate subsidi/irins
Inrrnasnd emt rnl iSMit ion
Increased training
Work simpl i f ication/marvi; .'ni
Sel 1 or close branches
Increase cor r<*sj[x/iv lent activity
Reduce di v<n si f icat ion
Uiange Staff compliant ion
Increase dejxjsit base
Di veroil/ Joan j/oi t fol to
10'duct \ <iu in loan voLume
Huttage portfolio /ui/I lo/in d<nwud

Turnaround
Banks

Decline
Banks

Total

7
6
8
5
7
5
6
4
4
4

9
10
7
8
5
7
5
7
7
7

16
16
15
13
12
12
11
11
11
11

4
5
6
5
5
1
3
l
2
2

7
5
4
4
4
5
3
5
3
3

11
10
10
9
9
6
6
6
5
5

2
4
2

2

4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

3
1
l
L
1

i

2
4
4
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
l
1
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the basis of customer grouping.

Quite often, the structural adaption is

of mixed breed; customer or geography based structures are combined with
centralized key departments.

A final type of structural arrangement is

the profit center concept; the company is organized around several busi¬
ness components that can be measured on profit performance.

This profit

center concept does not necessarily match the makeup of businesses within
the corporation; there can be more than one profit center within a single
business.
The review of annual reports identifies cost control as a key com¬
ponent of the turnaround effort, but offers little information as to the
form these cost controls take.

In general, there are two important classes

of cost controls within the conmercial bank industry:
non-interest costs.

interest costs and

Of these, interest costs for the higher component.

Many banks regard interest costs as given; diat is, interest costs are de¬
termined by the market and cannot be influenced by the bank*

In these

cases, the cost control effort is concentrated on the control of non¬
interest expenses.

The most important non-interest expenses are occupancy

expenses and personnel expenses.

In some cases, the banks do recognize

that they can exercise some control over interest expense.

Several strat¬

egies which can be classified as cost control strategies appear in this
set of strategies; they shall be discussed in order.
The development of new business is a frequently mentioned strategy.
As with all businesses, new business can take several forms.

New busi¬

ness can be old products sold to new customers, new business can be old
products sold to old customers, it can be new products sold to new cus¬
tomers, and it can be new products sold to old customers (Gutmann, 1964).
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The generation of new bank business follows all patterns.
The reduction in problem loan strategy appears frequently in the
sample.

This strategy usually involves the development of a new proce¬

dure for reviewing the status of loans.

For example, the non-payment

period that is used to identify problem loans is reduced, so that poten¬
tial problems are recognized earlier.

These potential problems are then

reviewed by a committee to ascertain the potential for future payment.
In most cases, a team of specialists is developed who spend full time on
the problem loans.

They offer advice to the customers that might result

in improved performance for the customer, i.e., give the customer the
ability to pay the loan;

they take steps to collect through legal means

vhere all other channels fail.

In some cases, the reduction in problem

loan strategy is developed around key industries or geographical areas.
A key industry can be depressed. The cannon case is the real estate in¬
dustry.
sons.

A key region might be depressed

for economic or other rea¬

A team of specialists is then formed to handle these specific loan

problems.

In most cases, this strategy is extended to new loans, which

involves sane changes in the policy lor loan approvals; limits are changed
for loan officers, audit procedures might be tightened, or statistical
models for classifying loans might be developed.
'Ihe reduction in personnel strategy is one of the cost control strat¬
egies.
tion.

Frequently, the reduction in personnel takes place through attri¬
Al

times, more active measures arc necessary.

In addition to re¬

ductions in personnel, many oi die sample banks act to limit the costs of
personnel by holding wage increases to inininum levels.
executive salaries.

One bonk Iroze
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The acquisition strategy is one method for generating new business.
It is also a method for reducing a bank's fluctuation in performance in
some cases.

The acquisition strategy is limited by regulatory agencies.

Before 1970, the major activity in acquisitions for conmercial banks was
in the area of bank purchases.

While some banks were prohibited from

the purchase of other banks by state regulation, many in other states
could and did.

After 1970, the banks' acquisition activity expanded due

to passage of federal regulations which permitted commercial banks to
engage in "bank related business" acquisitions.

After 1970, there was

a large movement by sample banks into such businesses as mortgages, leas¬
ing, and investment advisory services.
The idea that the banks should have targets and plans appears fre¬
quently in the sample.

Cccmon targets include market share, cost tar¬

gets, loan volume, loss volume, earning per share, and earnings.

Often,

the targets reflect the major directions of the bank's effort to change
performance.

Plans usually are limited to specific areas, such as growth

plans or personnel plans.
of social concern.

In some cases, banks list plans for activities

A few banks stress the importance of strategic plan¬

ning; in same cases, new departments or new procedures are developed
for strategic planning.

While not every report includes time spans in

their planning discussion, those that do direct their plans beyond a
single year.
The control of loan risks and credit rationing to decrease sensi¬
tivity are two of the strategies which are developed to avoid problems
in the Loan portfolio.

The control of risks has been discussed previ¬

ously; controls include careful review of both current loans and
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applications for loans.

In some cases, particularly for those banks which

invest in real estate investment trusts, the control of risk include a re¬
duction of the amount invested in a troubled industry.

Credit rationing

to decrease sensitivity is a strategy designed to protect the banks from
variations in the market interest rate.

During the 70's, the fluctuation

of the interest rate increased dramatically in comparison to earlier dec¬
ades.

Several times, the cost of short term money

to finance long term loans

which many banks use

exceeded the return of the portfolio.

Some

banks choose to decrease their exposure to this fluctuation by matching
their portfolios of assets and liabilities.

Variable rate liabilities

are matched with variable rate assets, and fixed rate liabilities are
matched with fixed rate assets.

The method used to accomplish this match

is credit rationing; loan applications are reviewed, and priced with the
match in mind.

Long terra fixed rate loan business is not accepted when

it increases the bank's sensitivity to the change in the cost of funds.
The addition of new branches, or replacing branches,

the addition

of new consumer services, the addition of new markets are all strategies
used to increase business.

New branches are used to develop a further

consumer base for both deposits and loans.

The experience of these sam¬

ple banks show that the return to new branches may not appear for sev¬
eral years.

New consumer services include automated teller machines,

and overdraft checking.

One key to the success of both new branches and

new consumer services is a successful marketing program.

The marketing

program often involves the use of branch personnel to cross sell services,
in an attempt to make a customer of the bank a full service customer.
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The new market strategy is a multi-faceted one; many of the strategies
which appear in this list are actually strategies to enter new markets.
Restricting growth is a strategy that involves the selective pruning
of the organization to improve its profitability and/or the discontinua¬
tion of acquisitions.

Most often, the restricting growth strategy fol¬

lows a period of aggressive growth strategy.

As such, this strategy is

one that is used after other strategies have failed.

Most often, this

strategy follows an attempt to improve returns from previous growth
cost cutting, etc.

by

In one case, this strategy was the initial strat¬

egy adopted by an organization to avoid decline.

While the bank had three

years of decline, it attributed this decline to short term economic
trends.

This judgment proved accurate, as this particular bank did en¬

act a turnaround.
New technology in operations, an option chosen six times, has dra¬
matic impact throughout the bank industry.

The growth of computer ap¬

plications, the advent of electronic funds transfer, and the growth of
automated teller machines has affected all banks.

The banks in the sam¬

ple, however, adopted new technologies in operations as a strategy to
improve cost control.

For the most part, the technology chosen applied

to the paper processing end of the business.

Systems were adopted which

could reduce the banks' dependence on clerical help.

In several cases,

this did not mean that the bank was relying on a new generation of ma¬
chines, but rather that the bank was adopting a present generation of
machines to better use.
The strategy of changing market definition is tied to the banks
choice of growth or restricting growth.

International growth requires
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an international market orientation, while restricting growth requires a
regional identification.

The market definitions comrunicate the bank's

strategy to relevant markets

and to bank personnel;

as such, this op¬

tion is a subset of the strategic posture of a bank.
The appointment of a new head man and a new management team often
occurred simultaneously.

After a short period of studying the organiza¬

tion, the new head man would recruit a new management team.

The appoint¬

ment of a new chief executive officer (see note) often followed a period
of major deterioration in the organizations performance.

In one case, the

major deterioration included several instances of fraud.

In another case,

the deterioration included public identification of the bank's declining
position.

In general, the strategies enacted by these new executives did

not differ appreciably from the strategies of veteran managers attempting
to turnaround performance; however, the argument might be advanced that
the newer executives did encounter some difficulties that veteran execu¬
tives would not, such as employee resistance.
One policy used to control non-interest costs is the attempt to in¬
crease the level of demand deposits.

This strategy usually included a

marketing component and a new services component.

The banks offered in¬

creased services as a method of "payment" for the use of deposit money.
This policy was in part a reaction to the increased sophistication on the
part of the consumer, who engaged in significant amounts of disinter
mediation during the period of this study.

Note:

In the sample, there were more than five new ceo's appointed; how¬
ever, many of the appointments were promotions of the second in
conmand. These are not categorized as new head men, in that they
had participated in the operations of the banks for years before
the appointment.
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Some banks increased staffing to take advantage of growth opportun¬
ities.

The fact that this strategy appears only in the turnaround sample

may be significant, and shall be discussed elsewhere.
Increased service charges obviously is an attempt to increase reve¬
nue.

Often, the increase in service charges is accompanied by a work study

and cost accounting program to identify the costs of services more clearly.
Merging branches and liquidating subsidiaries are part of the re¬
stricting growth strategy, as are selling or closing branches, reducing
diversification and restricting loan volume.

Increased centralization

often accompanies the attempt to change structure or to control costs.
Increased training and work simplification and management are matched with
cost control efforts.

Increased correspondent activity is a method for

increasing the bank's market or business.
The remaining strategies each were adopted in only one bank.

These

strategies include changing staff compensation, increasing the deposit
base, diversifying the loan portfolio, and managing the portfolio and
loan demand.
dent.

The purpose and definition of these strategies is self evi¬

The only comment that is required is to note that the management

of the loan portfolio and loan demand is a philosophy of portfolio man¬
agement that is different than the philosophy adopted when a bank chooses
to reduce its credit sensitivity.

Whereas the credit sensitivity strat¬

egy seeks to reduce the bank's exposure to fluctuations in the interest
rate, the use of the portfolio management strategy seeks to give the bank
full advantage of this fluctuation.

The bank attempts to predict the

trends of short term interest rates, and lend accordingly.

If there is

a prediction that short term rates will fall, the bank aggressively seeks
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long term business at the current high rate.

If the prediction is that

short term rates will rise, the bank declines current long term business
at the current low rate

and invests the money in short term securities,

which will then be turned over at the higher rate.

Of course, the suc¬

cess of this strategy is critically dependent upon the success of the
predictions of interest trends.

Sunmary of strategic choices.

The classification of strategies by fre¬

quency does not increase our understanding of the turnaround process for
two reasons.

First, the strategies are not unique; many are grouped to¬

gether to form a single strategy, with several components, for a particu¬
lar bank.

Second, there is no distinction between turnaround and decline

through the frequency count.

This section will attempt to group the

strategies into categories that often appear together; the next section
will discuss the difference between the turnaround and decline strategy.
Based on the quantitative analysis of previous chapters, we can state
that two classes of strategies are important in the turnaround process:
cost controls, and reduction in problem loans.

The quantitative analysis

of this chapter reveals that other classes of strategies are important:
growth, new business

or restricting growth strategies.

A fifth classi¬

fication is suggested by its frequency of appearance; that is the adop¬
tion of new structure.
The cost control strategies include reduction in personnel, action
to increase demand deposits relative to time and savings deposits, merg¬
ing branches, liquidating subsidiaries, increased training, work simpli¬
fication, closing branches, and adopting new technology to operations.
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The strategies used to reduce the level of problem loans include con¬
trolling loan risks

both by review of present bookings and improved pro¬

cedures for new bookings,

credit rationing and sensitivity management,

diversifying the loan portfolio, and managing loan portfolio and demand
for loans.
The new business growth strategies include acquisitions, new branches,
new consumer services, new markets, international expansion, increased
staffing, and increased correspondent activity.
The strategic options for restricting growth include merging branches,
closing or selling branches, liquidating subsidiaries, reducing diversi¬
fication of the corporation, and reducing loan volume.
The adoption of a new structure often accompanies the attempt at
turnaround.

This can mean increased centralization.

At times, the new

structure is designed by a new chief executive officer and/or a new man¬
agement team.

The alternative methods used to restructure the organiza¬

tion are discussed in the previous section.
This grouping of strategies leaves a few of the original set of strat¬
egies unclassified.

The use of targets and plans might be classified in

all the groupings; thus, these options are not classified.

The change of

market definition might be classified with growth, restricting growth, and
the reduction of problem loans.

The use of increased service charges and

actions to increase the deposit base are not readily classifiable.

Thus,

they remain unclassified.
This scheme of classification does not clarify the turnaround process
further.

A distinction needs to be made between those strategies that

lead to a turnaround and those that lead to a decline.

There are two
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methods for making this distinction; first, through the use of the quan¬
titative results of the previous chapter, and second, through the analy¬
sis of the pattern of the strategies identified in this chapter.

We turn

to the second task first.

The Difference Between the Decline Group
and the Turnaround Croup m Strategy Choice

Restricting the comparison of choice differences to those instances
where a strategy was chosen by more than one bank, there are only three
differences in the set of strategic choices.

Turnaround banks choose

training as part of their turnaround process in three cases, while none
of the decline banks choose training.

While this difference might be due

to chance, the pattern suggests that turnaround may require an investment
in training to change the performance of bank employees.

Decline banks

choose the option of restricting growth more often than the turnaround
banks.

In five of six cases, in which restricted growth is observed as

part of the strategy, the choice is not successful

and

does not lead

to turnaround in the six year period of the study.

Only decline banks

choose to merge branches or liquidate subsidiaries.

There are several

possible explanations for this difference between the groups.
the difference could be due to the nature of the decline.

First,

The decline

for the turnaround groups may not have been precipitated by unprofitable
growth, and therefore the turnaround groups need not restrict decline.
Second, this choice of turnaround strategy may be an option of last
choice.

It may be chosen after a bank has endured a period of decline

greater than three years.

The bank may have attempted other methods of
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turnaround before the decision to restrict growth; having failed at those;
it adopts the restriction strategy.

Third, this difference could indicate

that the banks chose the wrong strategy initially; that is, early in the
decline they chose to restrict growth; this choice led to further decline.
A review of the history of the banks which chose the option of restrict¬
ing growth reveals that the strategy to restrict growth is a strategy of
last choice.

For the five decline banks which enacted this strategy,

three enacted it in phase 2.

The remaining two banks enacted it during

the last year of phase 1.
The third difference between the groups is that the decline group
chooses the option of increased centralization in four cases, while this
option is never mentioned in the sample of turnaround banks.

This dif¬

ference suggests that either decentralized operations lead to a longer
term decline than centralized operations, or that the option of increas¬
ing centralization requires further time to succeed, or that the option
is not a successful one.

Unfortunately, the analysis offers little in¬

formation which can be used to accurately access the reasons for this dif¬
ference.

It is possible that the difference is due to chance, especially

since many of the strategies used by both groups increase centralization
de facto: loan limits, loan review groups, and new structure.
The following section compares these differences to the patterns and
differences discovered during the quantitative analysis.

Successful and Non-Successful Strategies

The relative lack of differences in the set of strategic choices be¬
tween groups suggests that the process of turnaround is not determined in
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the act of choosing a particular strategy, but rather in the act of im¬
plementing a particular strategy.

In general, two different banks can

choose the same strategy to turnaround performance.

That strategy might

be successful for one bank, and not successful for the other bank.

In

other words, the success of the turnaround is critically dependent on
management's ability to implement the strategic choice.
There are some indications, however, that other factors impact the
turnaround process.

These factors are the timing of the strategy, and

the nature of the decline.

Recall that there are performance differences

in the groups during phase 1 which were unanticipated at the design of
the study.

These differences could be due in part to timing.

The turn¬

around banks experience an increase in operating expenses early in the
decline; their loan losses increase during phase 1; their assets and de¬
posits grow more slowly; their loan income does not deteriorate.

These

banks may react more quickly to problem loans than the decline banks, and
increase investment in the attempt to reduce the level of problem loans.
Their sensitivity to problem loans influence them to choose growth oppor¬
tunities carefully, and to avoid some growth opportunities.

Their ini¬

tial reaction to loan losses and their initial increased investment pay
returns during phase 2, when their assets increase at a greater rate than
the decline groups.
The difference could also be due to initial strategic differences.
The decline group during phase 1 is increasing assets and deposits, but
it is not increasing its loan income/gross loans ratio.

The decline

group might consider that their lack of loan income is due to the start
up costs of the increased growth.

They do not react until later than

133
the turnaround group.

Upon the decision to react, the initial choice is

to enact the same types of strategies that the turnaround group enacted
increased operating expense to pay for tighter control of loans and the
increased effort to reduce problem loans.

If this initial attempt does

not pay off, the subsequent strategy is a decision to reduce growth.
In all likelihood, there are more than one type of decline; there¬
fore, there is more than one set of responses to the decline.
be a decline that is due solely to bad loan experience.

There may

This decline is

reversed by controlled growth and improved loan control procedures.

A

second type of decline is the decline that is caused by investment in
growth

in the loan portfolio and/or in acquisitions

returns that justify the cost.

that does not bring

The turnaround strategy in this case re¬

quires an attempt to turnaround the performance of the bad loans/acquisi¬
tions.

If such an attempt fails, the turnaround strategy then requires

that the bank restrict growth in some manner.

Unfortunately, this turn¬

around strategy requires more time than the six year period analyzed by
this study.

Summary

It is evident that the turnaround process is a complex one.

Ignor¬

ing for the moment the fact that there may be different causes of the de¬
cline, we can assert that any turnaround attempt requires attention on
several components of the business simultaneously.

An initial increase

in expenses may be required; for the turnaround to occur, returns must
accrue to these expenses within a short period of time.

The turnaround

requires careful analysis of growth opportunities; the growth opportunities
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must add to profit in the short term.

A key area of concern is the loan

portfolio; its quality (a high quality portfolio has minimal risk expo¬
sure) must be assured.

The turnaround process requires that a bank not

only reverse its poor performance in expense control, but that it also
improve performance in such areas as asset growth and equity growth.
tion is required on all fronts of the business.

Ac¬

Any initial increases

in expenses incurred to pay for the turnaround must be reduced shortly.
The turnaround may be acconpanied by a reduction in personnel; this re¬
duction in personnel cannot be successful unless there is a correspond¬
ing increase in productivity among remaining bank employees.
If there is more than one type of decline, the turnaround process
is even more complex.

The results of this analysis suggest that there

are at least two types of decline; a decline due to bad loan experi¬
ence, and a decline due to unsuccessful growth activity.
might also be caused by fraud.

A decline

A decline that can be traced to unsuc¬

cessful growth activity will take longer to reverse.
The major difference between the turnaround bank and the decline
bank is not due to the choices made to enact the decline, but rather
to the bank's ability to successfully implement a particular set of
choices.

Early response to the problem may be a key factor.

At this point, the time span of the study requires carmen t.
six year period of analysis is arbitrary.

The

At least one bank which

declined for the period of this study turned around; at least one
bank which had an impure turnaround almost failed in late 1979.

These

facts suggest that neither decline or turnaround is permanent; continued
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success requires attention to the changing conditions of the bank; con¬
tinued decline can be reversed.

CHAPTER

VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This chapter presents a summary of the study and its key conclu¬
sions; an analysis of the policy implications of the study; a critique
of the weaknesses of the study; and finally, some suggestions for future
research in the field.

A Restatement of the Study's .Objectives
and Conclusions

The study attempts to identify the key differences between banks which
turnaround performance after a decline, and those which do not tumaound
performance.

The initial design proposes that there would be specific

key differences between the turnaround and decline banks.
The initial sample is drawn from Bank Compustat tapes for the period
1959 through 1978.

The annual net income growth of each bank (136 total)

is compared to the annual growth in net income for the industry.

If a

bank's growth in net income for a particular year is less than the in¬
dustry wide growth in net income, then that year is labeled as a decline
year.

A bank qualifies for inclusion in the study if there are three

consecutive years of decline within the time span 1959 through 1978.
These first three years of decline are called phase 1.

For each

bank, the following three years, called phase 2, are then observed.

Dur¬

ing this second phase, the banks either declined or improved performance.
Those banks which improved performance in the second phase are labeled

136

137
turnaround banks; those banks which continued to decline are labeled de¬
cline banks.

These groupings are further subdivided into groups labeled

as "pure" and "impure."

In a case where phase 2 has three consecutive

years of growth or decline

in comparison with industry performance,

that case is labeled as pure decline or turnaround.

then

In a case where phase

2 exhibits growth in two of three years, the case is labeled impure turn¬
around.

In a case where phase 2 exhibits decline in two of three years,

the case is labeled impure decline.
The analysis, which includes quantitative and qualitative components,
is performed in two steps.

The "pure" groups are analyzed. In these

cases, phase 1 is a three year decline, while phase 2 is either a three
year decline or three years of growth.

Then, the full sample is analyzed.

The full sample is formed by combining the pure and impure cases; thus,
in the full sample analysis, some of the banks are classified on the basis
of their performance in two of three years during phase 2.
banks decline for three years during phase 1.

All of the

The final sample includes

51 banks, categorized as follows:
Pure turnaround
Impure turnaround
Pure decline

8
23
7

Impure decline

13

Total sample

51

The quantitative analysis is performed on twenty-three variables,
which are observed over the six year period of phase 1 and phase 2 for
all the banks in the sample.

These variables are chosen after a review

of the bank management literature to discover the variables most often
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used to analyze bank performance.

The twenty three variables chosen are

those developed by Dr. William Ford, a bank manager and a respected
analyst of bank performance.

The twenty three variables are tested in

a regression model to confirm their explanatory power.

These variables

are then used for the remaining analyses.
The quantitative analyses take place in two main steps.

First, per¬

formance for each group of banks is computed for each phase.

Performance

is defined as change over time.

The average change in each variable is

computed for each bank for phase 1 and 2.

Then, the mean performance of

each group (pure decline, pure turnaround, full sample decline, full sam¬
ple turnaround) is calculated, and a t-test for difference between the
group mean is performed.

Second, a discriminant analysis is run on each

group for the first, third, fourth, and six year of the sample period.
Thus, there are two discriminant analyses during phase 1, and two dis¬
criminant analyses during phase 2.
Two other types of tests are performed on the sample.

A t-test is

performed to compare the differences in the rate of decline between the
groups; this test is only run on phase 1.

A dummy regression is run to

judge the influence of certain key extraneous variables, that is, vari¬
ables not among the twenty three specifically analyzed.

These key vari¬

ables are the economic region of the bank, the size of the bank, and the
structure of the bank.
The qualitative analysis is a review of literature about the sample
banks.

Each bank in the sample is requested to provide information for

the period phase 1 and phase 2.

Those banks that respond to the inquiry

submit copies of their annual reports, copies of speeches before financial
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analysts, and copies of other reports written about the bank.
itative analysis relies heavily on this information.

The qual¬

An extensive re¬

view of the bank literature for the sample period supplies further infor¬
mation for analysis.
The remainder of this section presents the initial hypotheses, and
a brief sumnary of the results.

Hypothesis #1:

The rate of decline in net income for turnaround firms
will be greater than the rate of decline in net income
for decline firms.

This hypothesis was not supported at the .05 level of significance.
The rate of decline for turnaround firms was larger than the rate of de¬
cline for the decline firms, but not at a statistically significant
level.

Hypothesis #2:

The performance of the groups will be the same on the
financial and operating ratios for the decline phase
(Phase 1)

This hypothesis is not supported.

There are some differences in

performance between the groups during the first phase, when all groups
are declining.

Hypothesis #3:

The performance of the groups is different on the finan¬
cial and operating ratios for phase 2.

This hypothesis is confirmed.

The findings stress the importance

of the control of loan quality and overhead costs in the turnaround ef¬
fort.

Hypothesis #4:

The groups are not discriminated successfully during
phase 1 (discriminant analysis at year one and year
three).
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This hypothesis is confirmed.

There is not successful discrimina¬

tion during the first phase.

Hypothesis #5:

The groups are discriminated successfully when phase 2
is analyzed, that is, year 4 and year 6.

This hypothesis is supported.

The results at year six show the im¬

portance of several key variables in the turnaround process.
variables are:

These key

net income/employees, overhead/earning assets, operating

expense/eaming assets, asset growth, and loan loss provision/earning
assets.

When combined with the previous results, these results show that

the turnaround bank has controlled its overhead expenses, has recovered
from past loan losses and has begun to increase its asset base

follow¬

ing a period of slower growth during phase 1.

Hypothesis #6:

Several variables will be more important than the other
variables in the discriminant function.

As evidenced by the discussion of the last paragraph, this hypothesis
is supported.

The initial hypothesis suggests 8 key variables as discrim¬

inators; some of the eight are confirmed.

Hypothesis #7:

Extraneous variables will have insignificant effects.

With a few minor exceptions, this hypothesis is confirmed.

Since the twenty three variables represent eight types of performance
ratios, an attempt is made in the study to build scales for each of these
eight types of performance.
sis.

The scales are built through a factor analy¬

These eight scales are then used as input for discriminant analy¬

sis, following the format of the original hypotheses.
similar to those presented for the full data set.

The results are

In the sixth year, the
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key discrimination is provided by expense and credit quality control,
growth measures, and employee utilization measures.
The review of bank reports and other material leads to an interest¬
ing discovery.

With few minor exceptions, banks which decline describe

the same types of strategies as banks which turnaround.
which are used most frequently are:

Those strategies

the adoption of a new structure, the

introduction of cost controls, the addition of new business, and reduc¬
tion in personnel.

The fact that the turnaround and decline groups choose

the same type of strategies indicates either that the process of implement¬
ing strategies is more important than the choice of strategy, or that the
strategies chosen lead to the turnaround of a particular type of decline,
and those banks which did not turnaround experienced a different type of
decline than those that did turnaround.
The Policy Implications of the Study
The study has implications in three general fields; first the field of
policy research, second, the field of bank management, and third, the field
of bank regulation.

This section briefly reviews the implications in each

field.
Until relatively recently, the chief identifying characteristic of
the policy field has probably been the use of the case study as the pri¬
mary method for both teaching and research.

The case study has served

its purpose well, and still remains as an important research tool for
the field.

Recently, increasing attention has been given to the impor¬

tance of research that goes beyond the limitations of the case study,
and analyzes policy in a cross sectional and time series perspective.
This attention has given rise to a debate of the relative merits of quan¬
titative and qualitative research.

The debate is certainly not unique
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to the policy field (San Miguel, 1977), but its resolution does impact
the field of policy.
The debate, in this author's opinion, often misses a crucial dis¬
tinction.

The relative merits of a particular research methodology de¬

pend entirely upon the purpose of that methodology.

If the purpose of

research is to test theory, there can be little doubt that the method¬
ology requires quantification.

If the purpose of the research is to de¬

scribe phenomena, or to build theory, then qualitative research can be
useful.

In most cases, research is designed for several purposes.

In

the policy field, in particular, research is often practitioner oriented.
In the case of this particular research study, the attempt has been to
identify the key variables of concern for bank managers who are facing
a particular circumstance, that is, decline, in their organization.

The

quantitative analysis reveals what variables are important; not how the
manager can manipulate them; the qualitative analysis shows how managers
changed their organizations under conditions of decline.

Neither ap¬

proach, alone, offers aid to the practitioner; hopefully, the combina¬
tion of approaches offer that aid.
the field of knowledge can

When research design follows purpose,

and will

advance.

As the policy field moves from its reliance on the case study, it
moves toward theories of strategic behavior.
move is the creation of theories
across industries.

An important part of this

and the testing of theories

that apply

The experience of many managers, and the wisdom of

many researchers, suggests that the management skill can be carried
across industries; a successful executive will be successful in any in¬
dustry.

If this is true, then there are similarities between all
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organizations, and useful theory about the policy of organizations can
only be developed in cross sectional contexts.

While it may be true

that these similarities exist, to date, the nature of the similarities
and perhaps more importantly, the differences, have not been developed.
While we can successfully test theories about manufacturing industries,
we may not be able to combine these theories with theories about service
industries.

The assumption of this study is that banking is a unique

industry; while it may be similar to other industries, the problems and
concerns of the bank manager can not always be analyzed in a multi in¬
dustry context.

The development of a general theory of business policy

may have to await further study of conditions within specific industries.
Then, the base of industry specific studies can be used to build a model
based on the similarities and differences between industries.

While the

efforts in analyzing specific industries advance at the cost of sacri¬
ficing application to all industries, the efforts to build a general theory
without also analyzing specific industries runs the greater risk of gen¬
eralizing to everybody, but being entirely accurate for few industries.
In the field of bank management, this study has several implications.
Most generally, the study confirms that bank management can enact turn¬
around.

While regional economic conditions may affect the turnaround (it

is certainly easier to manage turnaround in a growth area than a decline
area), the study confirms that turnaround can take place in even declin¬
ing economic regions.

More specifically, the study identifies those

areas of concern that the turnaround manager must concentrate on.

The

two key areas are the loan portfolio and the control of overhead.

Ini¬

tially, the turnaround may require an increase in expense.

Eventually,
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the turnaround will require control of those expenses.
ity of personnel must be increased.

The productiv¬

The methods for increasing this

productivity includes the use of centralization in key areas, the reduc¬
tion of personnel, and the addition of new and profitable business.

The

successful turnaround bank reduces expenses while increasing output; it
improves its quality control and adds quality loans to its portfolio; it
grows slowly into new profitable ventures.

The decline bank grows; its

profits do not.
This study has some implications for the regulators of banks.

Given

that a bank has had three years of decline, there are certain actions
that the banks should begin to consider.

The regulator of a successful

bank will not only know those options; he will take action to encourage
bank managers to consider those options.

Perhaps more importantly, the

data available to the bank regulator far exceeds the data available to
this researcher.

This study only hints at the potential that such a base

offers; the regulators have access to a real life laboratory for testing
the effects of alternative policy options under alternate conditions.

Weaknesses of the Study

This study suffers from several weaknesses.

The time span of the

study coincides with a period of major change within the banking indus¬
try.

The impact of the change is not entirely clear even at this date.

Many of the strategies attempted by the sample banks were opportunities
newly available to the banking industry.
learning period for the bank industry.

The period is, in a sense, a
Thus, the conditions which con¬

tribute to both decline and turnaround may not be seen again.

New
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developments may bring entirely new conditions to the bank industry; these
new conditions may negate the findings of this study.
A second weakness is similar to the first, in that the time period
of the decline and turnaround may be a weakness.
long or too short a time period.

Six years may be too

Perhaps there is a difference between

short term decline and long term decline.

It is entirely unclear as to

whether this study would be labeled short or long term.

For those banks

which declined for the full six years of the study, there is still oppor¬
tunity for a turnaround. Public reports indicate that one of these banks
did, indeed, turnaround.

Further analysis is necessary to attain a clear

definition of the terms decline and turnaround.
Still another weakness of the study is its inability to isolate types
of decline.

Since this has been discussed earlier, further comment is

not necessary.
Since this study is exploratory in nature, it can not identify the
true causes of decline and/or turnaround.

It does identify those condi¬

tions which accompany a turnaround, and implicitly assumes that those
conditions can be controlled by management.
accurate.

The assumption may not be

There is an infinite set of alternate explanations that might

be used to explain the turnaround.

While this study lays to rest the

irost popular alternate explanations, others can not be rejected without
further testing.
As a final weakness, we must recognize the findings of some research¬
ers who suggest that the Compustat data base is not entirely accurate.
(for a discussion, see Glueck and Willis, 1979).

Different banks report

certain accounts in different ways, which makes comparisons across banks
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difficult.

For example, some banks combine reported items into one ac¬

count, while other banks list these reported items in separate accounts.
The Compustat Tapes are checked for validity in several steps (see Appen¬
dix) .

The variables used in this study are variables which are analyzed

by bank regulators and other regulators; under such conditions, there is
little chance for systematic error in the reports.

Suggestions for Further Research

The weakness of the study highlight several areas that require fur¬
ther research.

Longer time spans of decline should be investigated to

discover the patterns of turnaround in long term declines.

In addition,

the fact that there may be more than one type of decline suggests an area
for future research to identify if there are different types of decline,
and the implications for turnaround of such a difference.
Perhaps the most important research that could follow this study is
research into the implementation processes of turnaround strategies.
Such questions as when the decline is first recognized, how turnaround
strategies are formulated, how they are enacted, judged, and finished
are not answered by this research.

The present study suggest several

hypotheses that might be tested in a study of the implementation of a
turnaround; if this study provides seme useful hypotheses, it will have
many of its initial objectives.
In addition to research on the process of implementing strategy, use¬
ful research might be directed toward the analysis of types of decline.
the cases of banks which did not turnaround in this study, the continued
decline might be due to the fact that the initial strategies were

In
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inappropriate.

Hofer (1980) argues that the successful turnaround strat¬

egy is contingent upon the firm's operational and strategic position dur¬
ing the decline.

In the context of this study, we might reason that the

continued decline group differs from the turnaround group in type of de¬
cline, and therefore, the necessary strategies for turnaround are differ¬
ent.

Further research to build a taxonomy of decline types (and the appro¬

priate turnaround strategies for each decline type) will prove useful.
Another question not answered by this study is the relationship of
the traditional economic cycle to the process of decline and turnaround.
Intuitively, we would expect that there are more declines during reces¬
sionary times than during an expansion in the economy.

In this study, there

were both declines and turnarounds during both recession and expansion
periods.

However, the study makes no attempt to test for differences in

turnaround strategies between expansionary and recessionary times.

The

performance of the national economy may be a significant extraneous vari¬
able; the implications that the business cycle holds for the turnaround
process offer an interesting and significant opportunity for future research.
A final suggestion for future research is that further research on
the turnaround process is necessary for other industries.

As this work

is completed, the decline of the auto industry (and indeed, the decline
of the nation) are topics of current popular public interest.

The at¬

tendant theorizing about the cause and cures for the decline offer evi¬
dence for the current speculative state of our knowledge about the proc¬
ess of turnaround not only in the banking industry, but in other key in¬
dustries.

Further research can shed light on this important area of con¬

cern to managers, workers, and consumers.
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This appendix presents the definition of each of the variables used
in the study, as reported by the Campus tat tapes.

vl).

Net income/equity
Net income:

Net current operating earnings (after minority inter¬
est) plus net after tax and after minority interest
profit or loss on securities sold or redeemed. Ibis
net income figure is before any additions or deduc¬
tions for extraordinary items.

Equity:

This is computed by adding preferred stock (par value)
and the total book value.
Preferred stock (par value) is the total dollar value,
at par or stated value, of all preferred stock out¬
standing. Excludes the dollar value at par of all
preferred stock repurchased and carried as treasury
stock.
Total Book Value is the total equity of the common
stockholders in the capital of the bank. This includes
common stock, surplus, undivided profits, reserves for
contingencies, and other capital reserves.

v2).

Return on earning assets
Return:

This is computed by adding aggregate loan and invest¬
ment revenue, trading account income, and interest on
due from banks.

Earning
Assets:

This is computed by adding due from banks, total in¬
vestment securities, trading account securities, and
gross loans.
Aggregate loan and investment revenue is the sum total
of revenues received from all loan and investment
securities. This includes:
interest on fees and loans,
interest income on federal funds sold, interest income
on securities purchased with agreement to resell, and
total interest and dividends on investments.
Trading Account Income is the total revenues net of in¬
cidental expenses received from the bank's purchase
and/or resale of securities with other banks or with
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the public. Included income and expense items are:
interest and profits or losses on trading account
securities, re-evaluation adjustments, incidental
income and expenses related to the purchase and sale
of such securities. Non-incidental and indirect ex¬
penses (such as salaries, conmissions and interest
on borrowed money) are not netted against revenue.
Interest on Due from Banks is interest earned on de¬
posits in other banks.
Due From Banks is the sum total of deposits (time)
at other banks, which draw interest.
Total Investment Securities is the total of all secur¬
ities held in the bank's investment account.
Trading Account Securities is the aggregate net value
of all securities regularly purchased and held by the
bank in a dealer trading account for resale to other
banks and/or the public.
Gross Loans is the aggregate face value of all out¬
standing loans before the deduction of reserves for bad
debt losses on loans.
v3).

Net in teres t/eaming assets
Net Interest:

This is computed by adding aggregate loan and invest¬
ment revenue, trading account income, and interest on
due from banks; total interest expense is subtracted
from this figure. The first three items are defined
above; total interest costs are defined below.

Earning Assets are computed as reported above.
Total interest expense is the total interest paid on
deposits, borrowings, and capital notes and expendi¬
tures.
v4).

Operating expense/earning assets
Operating
Expenses:

The total of all operating expense charged against the
bank's operating revenue. This includes: aggregate
salaries and related expense, total interest on de¬
posits and borrowings, interest on capital notes and
debentures, and aggregate other current operating ex¬
pense. This item does not include income taxes.

Earning Assets are computed as explained above.
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v5).

Overhead/earning assets
Overhead:

This is reported as aggregate Other current expenses.

Earning assets are computed as explained above.
Aggregate Other Current Operating Expenses are the
total operating expenses reported by the bank, other
than salary and interest expense. This includes
provisions for loan losses, occupancy, expense of
bank premises, furniture and equipment expenses, and
other current operating expenses.
v6).

v7).

Interest on deposits/all deposits
Interest on
Deposits:'

The total interest and expense paid on all deposit
accounts and borrowed money.

Total
Deposits:

The total of all deposits in the bank's domestic and
foreign offices.

Interest on deposits/time and savings
Interest on deposits is defined above.
Time and savings is the aggregate amount of time and savings deposits.

v8).

Net income/employees
Net income is as defined above.
Employees is the total number of employees on the bank's payroll at
the end of the year.

v9).

Payroll expense/employees
Payroll expense is the sum expended for salaries and wages and for
employee benefits (pension and insurance, etc.)

vlO). Assets/employees
Assets are the total assets of the corporation
vll). Gross loans/all deposits
Gross loans includes gross loans and Federal funds sold and secur^ities purchased with agreement to resell (defined below)
Total deposits are as defined above.
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Federal funds sold and securities purchased with agreement to re¬
sell are the excess reserve balances, held in the Federal Reserve
Bank, that have been loaned to another bank; and loans made to
other banks and/or customers as a result of the acquisition of
securities (or negotiable evidence of indebtedness) that are under
resale agreements or similar arrangements.
vl2).

Cash and treasuries/total demand deposits
Cash and Treasuries is the sum of cash and due from banks, and
U.S. Treasury securities.
Total Demand Deposits is the total demand deposits in the bank.

vl3).

Loan income/gross loans
Loan income is the revenue received from interest and fees on loans.
Gross loans include gross loans and Federal funds sold, etc. (as
defined above).

vl4).

Securities income/securities
Securities income is the total income from investments, excepting
investments on state and town obligations
Securities is the average value of taxable investments for the
year.

vl5).

Municipal income/muncipals
Municipal income is the interest on state and town obligations.
Municipals is the average value of non-taxable investments for the
year.

vl6).

Loan loss provision/earning assets
The loan loss provision is the amount identified by management to
add to reserves for loans in a particular year.
Earning assets are computed as defined above.

vl7).

Gross chargeoffs/loans
Gross chargeoffs are the net credit or charge to reserves for debt
recovery.
Gross loans are computed as defined above.

163
vl8).

Equity/assets
Equity is computed as defined above.
Assets are the total assets of the bank.

vl9).

Loan loss coverage ratio
Loan loss coverage ratio is the sum of current operating earnings
before taxes and the provision for loan losses, divided
by the net credit or charge to reserves for debt re¬
covery.

v20).

Reserve/gross loans
Reserve is the current unused balance of the provisions made for
possible loan losses pursuant to the U.S. Treasury
tax formula. This includes the provision made pur¬
suant to the tax formula, and amounts in excess of
the formula which represent management judgment with
respect to possible loss.

v21).

Asset growth
Asset growth is the annual % growth in assets.

v22).

Deposit growth
Deposit growth is the annual % growth in deposits.

v23).

Equity growth
Equity growth is the annual % growth in equity.
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This appendix presents a brief description of each bank in the sample;
turnaround banks are described first.

Pure Turnaround Banks
Colorado National Bankshares
Between 1972 and 1978, Colorado National underwent decline and turn¬
around.

Colorado National is a registered bank holding company, with in¬

terests in commercial banking, leasing, real estate services, mortgage
banking, and insurance services.

In 1971, the corporation acquired two

banks, acquired a mortgage company, and organized a bank.
corporation acquired two more banks, and organized one.
ing company was formed.

In 1972, the
In 1973, a leas¬

In 1974, the corporation acquired two more banks

and formed an insurance agency.

In 1975, the bank entered a joint real

estate venture to build an office building.

In 1976, the corporation or¬

ganized an industrial bank.

Detroitbank Corporation
Detroitbank endured a decline and turnaround during the period 19691975.

In 1973, the corporation was formed to acquire the Detroit Bank and

Trust Company.

Detroitbank is a registered bank holding company with 121

domestic branches.

Its general banking services include international

banking, trust services, and leasing.
leasing company.

In 1974, the corporation formed a

In 1975, the corporation acquired a bank.

Mercantile Texas Corporation
This bank underwent decline and turnaround during the period 1971 to
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1977.

In 1975, the Mercantile Texas Corporation was formed to purchase the

Mercantile National Bank of Texas.

The corporation is a registered bank

holding company with subsidiaries in data processing and insurance.

During

the turnaround, significant corporate activities included the hiring of a
new chief executive officer and new managers, the introduction of the
profit center concept, the formation of the holding company, the acquisi¬
tion of a business, and an aggressive campaign to secure business in medium
sized corporations.

Midlantic Banks
Midlantic endured a decline and turnaround for the years 1972-1978.
During this period the corporation acquired several banks and a mortgage
company.

The corporation is a bank holding company with six conmercial

banking subsidiaries and three bank related subsidiaries.

The areas of

diversification include mortgage business, factoring, and leasing.

The

bank attributes part of its success to aggressive marketing (television
campaigns, etc.).

Society Corporation
The period 1970-1976 was one of decline and turnaround for the Society
Corporation.

During this period, the bank purchased several banks, and had

several others join the corporation as affiliates.
approval to form an insurance company.

The bank also received

The corporation's strategy during

this period included the use of market sensitive liabilities to support
market sensitive assets, the use of little diversification, the use of
cost controls, service to local markets, and the avoidance of high risk
loans.
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Union Conmerce Corporation
Union Conmerce entered its decline in 1966, and turned around by 1972.
In 1970, the corporation was formed to become the principal owner of the
Union Conmerce Bank.

Union Conmerce is the lead bank in the corporation,

which has three subsidiary banks.

The corporation now includes a leasing

company and a capital management company.

Union Planters Corporation
1972 to 1977 was a period of decline and turnaround for this corpora¬
tion, which was formed in 1971 to purchase the Union Planter's National
Bank of Memphis.

The business of the corporation include conmercial bank¬

ing, trust services, real estate financing, data processing, credit life
insurance, and mortgage banking.

This bank is somewhat unique in the sam¬

ple, in that during the period of the decline significant fraud problems
were uncovered.

The new management restructured the bank, entered new

businesses, installed new loan procedures, and reduced personnel.

United Virginia Bankshares
The period 1972 to 1978 was one of decline and turnaround.

These

years saw many acquisitions at the corporation; included among the ac¬
quisitions were conmercial banks and a factoring company.

Ihe corpora¬

tion also formed leasing and investment businesses during this time.
1978, the corporation sold the factoring company.
port describes its turnaround strategy:

In

The bank's annual re¬

"Our principal efforts in 1976

will be directed toward emphasizing quality and pricing, reducing loan
losses, restoring non-accrual assets to earning status, vigorously seek¬
ing core deposits — both demand and time and controlling non-interest
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expenses.

We shall continue to meet the needs of our customers by select¬

ing sound credits for productive purposes."

Impure Turnaround Banks
BankAmerica Corporation
The period of decline and turnaround for this banking giant was 1960
through 1966.

This time preceded the actual formation of the corporation,

which was in 1968.
Bank of America.

The corporation purchased what had been known as the

This bank provides consumer services, conmercial services,

trust services, leasing, funds management, data processing, real estate
services,and other bank related services.

Chemical New York Corporation
Chemical's decline and turnaround occurred in the period 1970 through
1976.

The bank's activities during this period included the acquisition

of several banks, a mortgage company, a consumer finance company, and an
investment advice company.

The bank's business covers 22 states and 38

countries, and includes a Metropolitan Bank, a Corporate Bank, an Inter¬
national Bank, a Trust and Investment Bank, and a Real Estate Bank.

Continental Illinois Corporation
The period of decline and turnaround for Continental was 1965 to
1971.

The holding company structure was adopted in 1968 (the corpora¬

tion purchased Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company).

The holding

company includes a mortgage bank, a reality advice firm, leasing services,
and venture capital services among its businesses.
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Fidelity Union Bancorp
In 1970, this corporation was formed to purchase Fidelity Union Trust
Company and two other banks.

Ihe period 1970 through 1976 included a

period of decline and turnaround.

During this period, the corporation

acquired several banks, and formed a data processing company (subsequently
discontinued).

The bank engages in international banking, corrmercial

banking, and consumer finance.

First Empire State Corporation
The period 1972 to 1978 was this bank's time of turnaround and decline.
They acquired several banks and formed a financial services corporation.
The bank's business includes commercial banking, real estate financing,
and small business capital formation.

First Hawaiian Incorporated
The corporation was formed in 1973 to become the holding company for
the First Hawaiian Bank of Honolulu.

The years 1971 through 1977 included

a time of decline and turnaround for the corporation.

During this time

period, the corporation formed an industrial loan company and a leasing
company.

The corporation's business includes the bank, a leasing company,

two thrift companies (loan companies) and a property management company.
The bank's turnaround efforts included the attempt to improve the perform¬
ance of the loan portfolio, and an attempt to control costs.

First Pennsylvania Corporation
The corporation's business includes commercial banking, mortgage
banking, consumer finance services, securities dealing, and investment
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advice.

The bank first entered its decline in 1972, and enacted its turn¬

around by 1978.

The bank's turnaround efforts included a restructuring

of major portions of the organization, the use of counter cyclical subsid¬
iaries, and aggressive portfolio management.

These moves were accompanied

by an attempt to control expenses (which included a staff reduction).
While this bank did enact a turnaround during the period of study, 1980
found the bank in considerable trouble.

Its failure was prevented only by

the assistance of several banks (whose efforts were encouraged by federal
authorities).

First Maryland Bancorp
The corporation was formed in 1973 to purchase the First National Bank
of Maryland, which had entered a decline in 1971.
tion had witnessed a turnaround.

By 1977, the corpora¬

During this period, the corporation ac¬

quired several banks and a credit business.

The corporation's businesses

include credit, leasing, mortgage banking, financial services, and commer¬
cial banking.

Hawaiian Bancorp Inc.
The corporation was formed in 1971 to purchase the Bank of Hawaii,
which entered its decline in 1969.

The decline was reversed by 1975.

Ihe

corporation's businesses include conmercial banking, foreign banking, in¬
vestment advice, computer services, leasing devices, and industrial loans.

Hospital Trust Corporation
Hospital Trust is a one bank holding company (formed in 1969 to ac¬
quire the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company) which enacted a turnaround
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during the period 1972 through 1978.

The corporation's businesses include

the bank, leasing services, construction mortgages, and short term loans
on income producing properties.

Huntington Bancshares
This multi-bank holding company declined and turned around during the
years 1970 through 1976.

In this period, the corporation acquired sev-

eral banks and formed a mortgage subsidiary.

The corporation's business

includes cotrmercial banicing, international banking, computer services,
real estate services, and investment counseling.

Liberty National Corporation
The Liberty National Corporation entered its decline in 1969 (one
year after the corporation was formed to buy Liberty National Bank and
Trust of Oklahoma), and reversed the decline by 1975.

During this time-

span, the corporation purchased a factoring company and formed a finan¬
cial corporation.

The corporate business includes two banks, a financial

corporation, a mortgage company, a real estate company, and a leasing
corporation.

Maryland National Corporation
The corporation declined and turned around during the period 1970
through 1976.

The bank formed several companies during this period:

a

leasing corporation, a realty advisory company, a capital management com¬
pany, an industrial finance company, and a home loan and realty company.
In addition, the corporation acquired two banks.
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Mellon National Corporation
The corporation was formed in 1971 to purchase the Mellon Bank, which
had entered its decline period in 1969.
reversed.

By 1975, the decline had been

During this time period, the bank (or its corporate headquar¬

ters) acquired or formed a mortgage company, a foreign bank, a leasing
company, and an international finance company.

National Detroit Corporation
The corporation was formed in 1972 to purchase the National Bank of
Detroit, which entered its period of decline in 1969.
accomplished by 1975.

The turnaround was

During this period, the corporation acquired sev¬

eral banks and formed a leasing company.

The corporate business includes

coranercial and retail banking, international banking, mortgage banking,
trust services, and computer services.

New England Merchant's Inc.
New England Merchant's National Bank entered its decline period in
1970.

The holding company (New England Merchant's Inc.) was formed in

1971.

Turnaround was achieved by 1976.

During this period, the corpor¬

ation acquired some banks, and formed a realty company and an investment
advisors group.

In addition, a leasing company became a subsidiary.

The

corporation engages in commercial banking services, and bank related busi¬
ness such as venture capital, leasing, and realty financing.

Northern Trust Corporation
The corporation was formed in 1971 to purchase Northern Trust Bank.
The corporation enacted a turnaround during the period 1970 to 1976.
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During this period, the corporation formed a farm management company, and
several trust companies.

The corporation's businesses include domestic

banking, international banking, trust services, bond underwriting and
distribution, farmland fiduciary management, and leasing activities.

Pittsburgh National Corporation
The corporation declined and turned around in the period 1970 to
1976.

The corporation is a one bank holding company with interests in

insurance and mortgage banking.

During the period, the corporation formed

a company to provide financing for its affiliates, and formed an insurance
related business.

One strategy recognized for its contribution in the

bank's success was the strategy of finding a market "niche" in foreign
operations, so that the bank did not compete directly with major inter¬
national banks.

This strategy involved lending internationally on die

basis of regional expertise; that is, supporting international lending
with regional sources of money, and providing lending needs for local com¬
panies which compete on the international markets.

Republic of Texas Corporation
The corporation form was enacted in 1974 to reorganize the Republic
National Bank of Dallas, which declined and turned around during die period
1970 through 1976.
banks.

During this period, the corporation acquired several

The corporate business includes domestic and international banic¬

ing, trust services, government securities underwriting, mortgage banking,
credit life insurance, and other bank related services.

During 1973, die

bank recorded the second highest growth rate among the year's top growdi
banking companies (the bank ranked 51st in the previous year).
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Texas Commerce Bancshares
Texas Cotnnerce enacted a turnaround during the period 1964 to 1970.
The corporation's business includes commercial banking services, inter¬
national banking, leasing, money market operations, personal banking, and
trust services.

United Bank Corporation of New York
This multibank holding company was incorporated in 1971, the first
year of the bank's decline.

The corporation staged a turnaround by 1977.

During this period, the bank acquired several banks.

In addition to bank¬

ing services, the corporation offers non-banking services such as leasing
and data management.

United National Bank of Pittsburg
This bank enacted a turnaround during the years 1969 to 1975.
this period, one bank merged into United National.

During

The bank offers com¬

mercial, savings, trust and real estate services.

Western Bancorporation
The corporation began its decline in 1970, and completed its turn¬
around by 1976.
sidiaries.

During this period, the bank merged several of its sub¬

In addition, the bank formed a finance company in Hong Kong,

acquired an asset management company, and a data processing subsidiary.
The corporation holds controlling interests in 22 banks operating in 11
states; it provides a wide range of banking and bank related services.
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Pure Decline Banks
Baybanks Incorporated
Baybanks entered a decline period for the year

1969 through 1975.

Baybanks is a multi-bank holding company, which owns a majority interest
in eleven banks in Massachusetts.

The member banks control a small busi¬

ness investment company, a data services company, and a finance and leas¬
ing company.

Equimark Corporation
The corporation was formed in 1968 to acquire control of Western
Pennsylvania National Bank.
1970 to 1976.

The corporation declined during the years

In the year previous to the decline, the bank acquired an

equipment leasing company, which was subsequently sold (1975).

During

the decline, the company acquired a consumer finance company, which was
also subsequently sold (1975).

The company formed and sold another bank

related business (this sale was in 1976), and formed a corrmercial finance
company.

Greater Jersey Bancorp
The corporation was formed in 1971 to reorganize the New Jersey Bank,
N.A.

The company experienced decline for the period 1971 to 1977.

Dur¬

ing this time, the company acquired several banks and a mortgage company.
The chief subsidiaries of the corporation included the bank, a mortgage
company, and a leasing company.

Towards the end of the decline, the com¬

pany enacted strategies to concentrate its market in a portion of the
state (rather than the whole state) and to control costs.
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Hartford National Corporation
Hartford National endured a decline for the period 1969 through 1975.
During this time, the company established a realty company, formed a trust
company, and formed a financial services company.
terest in a mortgage company.

In 1973, it sold its in¬

Its major businesses included domestic bank¬

ing, international banking, trust services, bond operations, and venture
capital for small businesses.

Lincoln First Banks
During its period of decline from 1969 to 1975, Lincoln acquired sev¬
eral banks, a mortgage company, and formed a comnercial finance corpora¬
tion.

During this time, the company restructured its operations, which

moved from a functional structure to a customer oriented structure.

Marine Midland Banks
Marine Midland experienced decline for the period 1969 to 1975.

Dur¬

ing this period, the bank changed to a regional structure (which was sub¬
sequently changed again when N.Y. State passed a law permitting unit branch
banking in the state).

During the decline, the bank froze executive sal¬

aries and engaged in personnel reduction efforts.

An attempt was made to

match the sensitivity of assets and liabilities, to avoid wide swings in
return.

Attempts were made to control all costs.

After this period, the

bank was purchased by a Hong Kong bank.

Shawm t Corporation
Shawmut endured a decline during the period 1969 to 1975.
this period, the corporation acquired and merged several banks.

During
The bank

restructured its management group, tightened its loan review procedures,

177
and took a cautious attitude toward asset expansion.

Toward the end of

the period, the bank recognized the need to reduce the loan portfolio, and
to control expenses (both by the use of standardized products and operat¬
ing procedures, and by the reduction of staffing levels).

Impure Decline Banks
Bancal Tristate Corporation
Bancal is a one bank holding company which experienced decline for
the period 1971 to 1977.

During this period, the bank's management recog¬

nized that previous growth had caused increased expenses; management turned
its attention to these expenses.

The attention included attempts to re¬

duce staff and to control occupancy expenses.

The bank also added subsid¬

iaries in leasing data management, investment advisory services, and cap¬
ital management.

During the later stages of the decline, the bank acted

to divest itself of unprofitable subsidiaries (a mortgage company was sold
in 1975).

At this time, the bank dropped some of its loan business, added

new management, restructured its loan portfolio, and adopted a new loan
review procedure.

The bank also sold 30 branches.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Banco Popular is a corporation whose headquarters is in Puerto Rico.
Its business includes banks in Puerto Rico, New York, and Los Angeles.
During its decline period (1972-1978) the corporation expanded interna¬
tional business through the use of correspondent relationships, added new
branches, opened its Los Angeles branch, liquidated a subsidiary, and pur¬
chased a bank.
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CBT Corporation
The Corporation was formed to serve as the holding company for the
Connecticut Bank and Trust Company in 1970.
decline for the period 1969 to 1975.

The corporation endured a

During this period, the corporation

formed several companies (in data services, realty, capital management,
business credit).

The corporation also acquired a bank, a financial cor¬

poration, and a discount corporation.

The corporation's businesses in¬

cluded consumer finance, correspondent activities, data processing, trust
services, financial services, capital management, and international bank¬
ing.

Crocker National Corporation
Crocker National Corporation experienced a decline for the period 1969
to 1975.

During this time, the corporation acquired a leasing ccaiipany and

a mortgage company, and formed a small business investment company.

Most

of this business was sold after the period of the decline (in 1977 and 1978).
The bank underwent significant management changes during the decline.

New

management hired many specialists from outside the bank, adopted a new
structure, changed staff compensation, increased training, and reduced
borrowing.

After the period of this study, the new CEO was named Banker

of The Year, in recognition of his successful attempts to reverse the de¬
cline.

Financial General Bankshares
Financial General experienced decline for the period 1971 to 19/7.
During this period, the bank formed a new bank in the Virgin Islands, sold
its majority interest in several banks, sold its minority interest in
several banks, and merged two banks.
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First Union Corporation (N.C.)
First Union endured decline for the period 1971 to 1977.

During this

time, the bank adopted tight controls of expenses, adopted a new structure,
shifted its attention from growth to consolidation, consolidated loan of¬
fices

and reduced personnel, trained specialized staff to deal with prob¬

lem loans, and increased its attention to consumer and commercial loans
while restricting its attention to housing and real estate lending.

General Bancshares
General Bancshares showed decline for the period 1970 to 1976.
ing the period, the bank acquired other banks.

Dur¬

The corporation is a hold¬

ing company designed solely for the ownership and management of banks, with
a controlling interest in 12 banks.

Girard Company
The Girard Company's period of decline for this study was 1969 to
1975.

Early in the decline, bank management recognized that the bank's

low level of performance could be traced to a combination of difficult
economic conditions, and problems within the bank.

The bank instituted

a work management program, acquired an investment group, and acquired some
new branches.

The bank embarked on a new program of loan diversification

to increase profit margins and reduce the concentration of borrowing by
major domestic corporations.
and some new foreign offices.

The bank obtained a new leasing corporation,
The bank increased its concentration on loan

criteria and pricing policy, as well as cost control.
attempt to increase its performance in local markets.

The bank made an
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Indiana National Corporation
Indiana National experienced decline for most of the period 1972 to
1978.

During this period, the bank formed a leasing company, a finance

company, a property management company, a realty advisors company, and a
mortgage company.

It acquired a credit insurance company, and discontinued

its business in mobile home services.

Philadelphia National Corporation
Philadelphia National Corporation experienced its decline in the years
1971 to 1977.

During this period, the bank activated a comnercial finance

company, acquired a consumer finance company, and increased its holdings
in a British bank.
changes.

The bank adopted internal management and structural

Towards the later years of this decline, the bank strengthened

its strategic planning process to emphasize careful market identification
and allocation of resources.

It adapted new procedures to promptly iden¬

tify problem loans.

Security Pacific Corporation
Security Pacific endured a decline for the period 1969 to 1975.
ing this time, it adopted the holding company structure (1972).

Dur¬

The cor-

poration acquired a financial company and an investment company, and formed
a leasing company.

It increased its services (in part by its adoption of

the Master Charge card), and expanded its business in northern California
and in international markets.

The corporation reorganized its corporate

banking branch along industry lines.
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State Street Boston Corporation
The corporation was formed as a one bank holding company to acquire
the assets of the State Street Bank and Trust Company in 1970.
the years 1969 to 1975, the bank declined.

During

Significant activities dur¬

ing this time included the formation of a credit company, the formation
of a securities service corporation, and the formation of a financial
services company.

These activities were accompanied by the purchase of

real estate companies, a mortgage company, and banks.
ized its structure.

The bank reorgan¬

It reduced its investments in a problem area — real

estate.

Southwest Bancshares
This bank experienced decline during the period 1972 through 1978.
During the period, the corporation acquired several companies, merged a
bank into the company, and formed a life insurance company.

The corpora¬

tion's major businesses included conmercial banking, mortgage banking,
leasing, personal property management, and credit life insurance.
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APPENDIX C:

COMPUSTAT

Standard and Poor's Bank Compustat is a data file which records
quarterly and annual performance data for major banks.

The sources of

this data include 10k (annual) and 10Q (quarterly) reports to the Secur¬
ity Exchange Commission, company annual reports, company news releases
and general reports, and company contacts.
The Compustat tapes are checked systematically to assure their va¬
lidity.

Spot checks are performed to assure the accurate recording of

data; data is compared against past data to detect fluctuations that
might be due to erroneous recording; the data is checked for accuracy
within parameters by crosschecking categories of data (e.g., does the
closing price of a stock fall within the range of highs and lows for the
stock within a certain period).

As a further check, the research staff

receives comprehensive training, and is assigned individual industry re¬
sponsibility.

APPENDIX D
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APPENDIX D:

CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS

The companies in the sample are chosen by comparing their performance
in a given year against the industry's performance for that year.

As of

1/1/79 the method for accounting for the industry was changed from a cash
to an accrual basis; therefore, comparisons of the year 1969 to the year
1968 are not based on consistent performance measures; net income changes
could be due to the accounting change, rather than actual changes in per¬
formance.

Three banks in the study include the year 1969 as years of de¬

cline or turnaround.
1.

For one of the banks, the year 1969 appears in phase

For this particular bank, the decline during the year was so dramatic

that it leaves little doubt that the year was truly a decline.
remaining two banks, the year 1969 appears during phase 2.

For the

In one case,

1969 is a decline year, while in the other case, 1969 is a growth year.
The decline is 8.4%, while the growth is greater than 20%.

We can be

fairly confident that the growth rate of 20% reflects actual growth.

We

could suspect that the decline rate is low enough to justify the argu¬
ment that the change was not due to an actual performance change, but
rather to the accounting change.

If this objection is true; the bank

in question would change from an inconsistent turnaround (that is, a
member of the impure turnaround group) to a pure turnaround bank.

This

change would not impact the results of the study in any significant way,
since pure turnaround banks are also included as members of the impure
group.

